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I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the South Carolina Probate Code
(SCPC) 1 introduces into South Carolina law a body of statutory
material far-reaching in its scope, wide-ranging in its effect, and
relatively detailed (some may argue labyrinthian) in its content.
The SCPC significantly affects the law governing the transfer
and administration of estates, areas of legal study and practice
perhaps heretofore recognized as resistant to change and modernization.2 Although the Code replaces, rearranges, and complements estate law in many areas, it impacts most significantly the
treatment of decedents' estates, both substantively and procedurally. This Article focuses on the changes wrought by the
Code to the substantive areas concerning the transfer of dece-

1. South Carolina Probate Code, 1986 S.C. Acts 34, No. 539. This Article also refers
to the South Carolina Probate Code as the "SCPC" and the "Code." The SCPC is codified at Title 62 of the South Carolina Code. References to the Code herein are to Title
62. The article and section numbers of the act correspond to the part and section numbers of Title 62. For example, a reference to S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201 (1976) refers to
the section found at SCPC § 1-201.
2. The historical progress of the SCPC seems to pay homage to the static tradition
of trust and estate law. Based upon the Uniform Probate Code promulgated by the
American Bar Association's Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, the SCPC
received consideration, in varying degrees of seriousness, over the last two decades. For
an excellent detailed history of the Code, see LeBlanc, The Proposed South Carolina
Probate Code, 36 S.C.L. REv. 511 (1985). For an example of the call for probate reform
during the period of consideration, see Braun, Probate Reform for South Carolina:An
Introduction to the Uniform Probate Code, 29 S.C.L. REv. 397 (1978).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

614

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
South
Carolina
Law Review,
38, Iss. 4 [2020], Art.[Vol.
2

38

dents' estates, testate and intestate, comparing the prior South
Carolina law where appropriate.'
II.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION: APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM

A.

Shares of Heirs

1. General Policy Considerations
The SCPC sections governing intestate succession provide
for the passing of any part of a decedent's estate that is not disposed of by the decedent's will. 4 The prior South Carolina statute of descent and distribution did not provide expressly for the
5
situations in which it would apply.
The SCPC system of distributing intestate property contemplates certain policy considerations. In any intestacy scheme
the legislature presumes a dispository preference of the intestate
decedent. The state must decide which relatives of the decedent
will receive the decedent's property to the exclusion of others.
The SCPC essentially utilizes a parentelic system of determining
which relatives should take.6 A parentelic method refers to a decedent's parents (and possibly other lineal ancestors, depending
upon the extent the statute allows) and their issue to decide the
priority of taking. Prior South Carolina law relied more on a degree-of-relationship, or consanguinity, method to determine
which relatives to favor over others.
Another policy consideration concerns the limit of relationship after which the state becomes a more worthy taker than a
3. The SCPC generally became effective on July 1, 1987. A number of sections of
the SCPC were amended before the general effective date by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171
(S.530), also generally effective on July 1, 1987. This Article refers to the South Carolina
law in effect before that date as the "prior law" or "prior South Carolina law." References herein to South Carolina Code sections not contained in Title 62 refer to statutory
sections in effect prior to the effective date of the Code, some of which were repealed or
recodified by the Code as indicated.
4. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 62-2-101 (1976).
5. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). The 1976 codification inadvertently deleted the introductory paragraph from its predecessor, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-52 (1962), which read as follows: "When any person shall die without disposing
of the same by will his estate, real and personal, shall be distributed in the following
manner: ......
6. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103 (1976).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPO).
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distant relative. A well-drafted intestacy statute prohibits the
inheritance of property by the laughing heir, so called because
he is too distantly related to grieve over the decedent's death
but is thrilled about his windfall. The SCPC limits the possibility of a laughing heir more effectively than did prior South Carolina law.' By reducing the possibility of extremely remote relatives from inheriting, the SCPC also recognizes the policy
concern of streamlining resolution of title questions, particularly
with respect to real property.'
2. South Carolina Probate Code
(a) The Spouse
The SCPC provides that the surviving spouse of the intestate decedent will receive all of the estate if no issue survive the
decedent and one-half of the estate if issue survive. 10
(b) Heirs Other than the Surviving Spouse
After determination of the share of the surviving spouse, the
other heirs take the balance, if any."1 These heirs take in the
following order of priority and in the following proportions:
(1) The issue of the decedent take equally if they are all of
the same degree of kinship. If, however, they are of unequal degree of kinship, they take by representation, a system by which
certain issue of a predeceased heir take the share that prede12
ceased heir would have taken had he survived the decedent.
(2) If no issue survive, then the parents of the decedent take
equally. If only one parent of the decedent survives, that parent
8. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §. 62-2-103, -105 (1976) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20
(1976) (repealed by the SCPC). See Cavers, Change in the American Family and the
"Laughing Heir," 20 IOWA L. REV. 203 (1935). Deciding at what point to exclude relatives
from inheritance in order to prevent a windfall to the laughing heir is a policy decision
that risks an overly restrictive limitation on the rights of deserving heirs.
9. See, e.g., In re Wendel's Will, 143 Misc. 480, 257 N.Y.S. 87 (1932). For a more

scientific approach to the determination of a decedent's dispositive preferences, see
Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfer, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1981).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-102 (1976).
11. Id. § 62-2-103.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(1) (1976). For a discussion of the operative elements
of representation under the SCPC, see infra text accompanying notes 53-60.
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takes all. 13 Note that the entire estate passes at this level and at
all other levels of heirs more remotely related. To reach this
level, the decedent's spouse necessarily has predeceased the decedent since a surviving spouse must share only with surviving
issue and otherwise takes the entire estate, leaving
no remainder
14
for heirs at this and other more remote levels.
(3) If no issue or parent survive, the issue of the decedent's
parents take by representation. 5 Issue may take whether of the
whole-blood or of the half-blood,16 except that if any wholeblood sibling of the decedent survives, then that sibling, or those
siblings, and the issue of predeceased whole-blood siblings take
to the exclusion of half-blood siblings and their issue. 1 7 Thus,
the SCPC retains in a somewhat modified form the preference
under prior law for whole-blood brothers and sisters over halfblood brothers and sisters.'
(4) If no issue, parent, or issue of a parent survive, the
grandparents of the decedent take equally. One-half of the estate passes to the maternal grandparent side and the other half
passes to the paternal side. If more than one grandparent survives on the maternal side, the paternal side, or both, then the
grandparents on that side share equally. If only one grandparent
survives on the maternal side, the paternal side, or both, then
that grandparent takes the entire share for that side. If no
grandparent survives on the maternal side, the paternal side, or
both, then the issue of the grandparents on that side take the
share of that side by representation. 9 If no grandparent or issue
survive on the maternal side or the paternal side, then the share
of that side passes to the side that does have a surviving grand13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(2) (1976).
14. See supra text accompanying note 10.
15. For a discussion of the operative elements of representation under the SCPC,
see infra text accompanying notes 53-60. Collateral kindred are blood relatives of the
decedent who are not ancestors or issue. Descendants of the decedent's parents (who are
not issue of the decedent) are first line collateral. The SCPC system of intestate succession, being generally parentelic, prefers those kindred who are in nearer collateral lines
to those in more remote collateral lines. See supra text accompanying notes 6 & 7.
16. Children of both parents are whole blood. Children with only one common par-

ent are half blood.
17. S.C. CODE ANN, § 62-2-103(3) (1976). For a more detailed discussion with examples of the treatment of whole and half-blood kin under the SCPC, see infra text accom-

panying notes 61-67.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 61-74.
19. See infra subpart II.C.
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parent or issue.2°
(5) If no issue, parent, issue of a parent, grandparent, or issue of a grandparent survive, then the great-grandparents of the
decedent take equally. One-half of the estate passes to the maternal great-grandparent side and the other half passes to the
paternal side. If more than one great-grandparent survives on
the maternal side, the paternal side, or both, then the greatgrandparents on that side share equally. If only one great-grandparent survives on the maternal side, the paternal side, or both,
then that great-grandparent takes the entire share for that side.
If no great-grandparent survives on the maternal side, the paternal side, or both, then the issue of the great-grandparents on
that side take the share of that side by representation. 1 If no
great-grandparent or issue survive on the maternal side or the
paternal side, then the share of that side passes to the side
which does have a surviving great-grandparent or issue."
(6) If no issue, parent, issue of a parent, grandparent, issue
of a grandparent, great-grandparent, or issue of a great-grandparent survive, then the stepchildren2 3 of the decedent take
equally.24 Surviving issue of predeceased stepchildren take by
25
representation.
(7) If no issue, parent, issue of a parent, grandparent, issue
of a grandparent, great-grandparent, issue of a great-grandparent, stepchild, or issue of a stepchild survive, then the estate escheats to the State of South Carolina.26
3. Prior South Carolina Law
(a)

The Spouse

Prior South Carolina law provided that the share of the surviving spouse depended upon whether certain other classes of

20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(4) (1976).
21. See infra subpart II.C.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(5) (1976).
23. A stepchild is the child of decedent's spouse but not the child of decedent. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(40) (1976).
24. Id. § 62-2-103(6).
25. See infra subpart II.C.
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-105 (1976).
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heirs also survived the decedent.2 7
The spouse received one-third of the estate if more than one
child either survived the decedent or predeceased the decedent
but left issue surviving at the time of the intestate's death. 2 The
spouse received one-half2 9 of the estate if only one child survived
the decedent or if no child survived the decedent but issue of
only one child survived the intestate.30 If no children or issue
survived the decedent, the surviving spouse received one-half
the estate if any of the following classes of heirs survived the
decedent: Father, mother, whole-blood sibling, child of wholeblood sibling (i.e., whole-blood niece or nephew), half-blood sibling, or lineal ancestor. 1 The surviving spouse inherited the en32
tire estate only if none of these heirs survived the decedent.
(b)

Heirs Other than the Surviving Spouse

After determination of the share of the surviving spouse, the
other heirs took the balance, if any.33 These heirs took in the
following order of priority and in the following proportions:
(1) If only one child (or issue of only one child) survived the
decedent, that child, or his issue, took the balance of the estate
(one-half if the decedent's spouse survived, and all if no surviving spouse). If more than one child survived the decedent or left
issue surviving the decedent, those children or their issue divided the balance of the estate (two-thirds if the decedent's
spouse survived; all if no surviving spouse).3 4 The methodology

27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).

28. Id.
29. Section 21-3-20 (repealed by the SCPC) referred to a moiety, which is
equivalent to one-half of the intestate estate.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
31. Id.
32. Id. The SCPC generally allows the surviving spouse to take a greater share of
the intestate estate, since the share of that spouse is never less than one-half and is
divided with other heirs in far fewer situations (only with surviving children or issue)
than under prior law. See supra text accompanying note 10. Consequently, as to spousal
inheritance, the SCPC appears to reflect more accurately the expectations of many laymen. See Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform ProbateCodes, 63 IOWA L. REV.
1041, 1078-1100 (1978); see also LeBlanc, supra note 2, at 525; Sayre, Husband and Wife
as Statutory Heirs, 42 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1929).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
34. Id.
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of representation determined whether and to what extent issue
would share in the estate. 5
(2) If no child or issue survived, then the surviving father,
mother, and whole-blood siblings of the intestate took equal
shares.3 6 The prior statute of descent and distribution allowed
limited representation at this level: children (but no other issue)
of predeceased whole-blood siblings could take the share their
parent would have taken had that parent survived the intestate.37 If no parent or whole-blood sibling survived, any child
representing a whole-blood sibling would have to share with any
surviving half-blood brother or sister of the intestate."'
(3) If no child or issue of a child, parent, or brother or sister
of the whole blood survived, then the half-blood siblings divided
the estate equally, but had to share with any children of wholeblood siblings. 9 Unlike a whole-blood niece and nephew, however, a half-blood niece or nephew of the intestate could not
take the share his or her parent would have taken had that parent survived. 40 If half-blood siblings had to share with children
of whole-blood siblings, each took per stirpes.41 For example, if
the intestate were survived by two half-blood siblings and two
whole-blood nephews (the sons of a predeceased whole-blood
brother), each half-blood sibling would take one-third of the estate while each whole-blood nephew would inherit one-sixth.42

35. Stent v. M'Leod, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) 354 (1827). For a discussion of the
operative elements of representation under prior South Carolina law, see infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(2) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). Prior South Carolina law preferred whole-blood kin over half-blood kin at this level. For a discussion of
the treatment of half-blood kin under prior South Carolina law, see infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(2), (3) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
38. Id. § 21-3-20(4) (repealed by the SCPC); see infra text accompanying notes 6874.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(4) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) maintained a discrimination for whole blood
and half blood at the niece and nephew level as well.
41. For a discussion of the treatment of half-blood kin under prior South Carolina
law, see infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
42. The statute divided the shares to be taken by these heirs into the number of the
intestate's half-blood siblings plus the number of predeceased whole-blood siblings who
left surviving children. The half-blood siblings each took a share. The whole-blood nieces
and nephews each divided the share their parent (the whole-blood sibling) would have
taken had he or she survived. Felder v. Felder, 26 S.C. Eq. (5 Rich. Eq.) 509 (1853). This
led to an interesting result, since one simplified view of representation is that it allows a
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(4) If no child or issue of a child, parent, whole-blood sibling
or child thereof, or brother or sister of the half-blood survived,
then lineal ancestors shared the estate equally.43
(5) If no child or issue of a child, parent, whole-blood
brother or sister or child thereof, half-blood sibling, or lineal ancestor survived, then the uncles and aunts of the decedent took
equal shares of the estate. Prior law allowed limited representation at this level: children, but no other issue, of a predeceased
uncle or aunt could take the share their parent would have
taken had that parent survived the intestate. 4 Note that for an
heir at this and more remote levels to share in the estate, the
decedent's spouse necessarily predeceased the decedent. If the
decedent's spouse had survived, heirs at this and more remote
levels would not have shared in the estate; the spouse would
have taken all.45
(6) If no child or issue of a child, parent, whole-blood sibling
or child thereof, half-blood sibling, lineal ancestor, or uncle or
aunt or child of an uncle or aunt survived, then the nearest
next-of-kin took equally.46 All next-of-kin of the nearest equal
degree of proximity shared. Any next-of-kin of more remote degree did not inherit. The degree-of-relationship, or consanguinity, method determined the proximity of the next-of-kin.47
(7) If no child or issue of a child, parent, whole-blood sibling
or child thereof, half-blood sibling, lineal ancestor, uncle or aunt
or child of an uncle or aunt, or next-of-kin survived, then
any
48
stepchildren of the decedent divided the estate equally.

(8) If no child or issue of a child, parent, whole-blood sibling
or child thereof, half-blood sibling, lineal ancestor, uncle or aunt
or child of an uncle or aunt, next-of-kin, or stepchild survived,
the estate escheated to the State.49

descendent of a predeceased "heir" to take the share that heir would have taken had he
or she survived. In this example, however, had the nephews' father survived, he would
not have had to share the estate with any half-blood siblings. For a discussion of half
and whole-blood siblings, see infra text accompanying notes 61-74.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(5) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
44. Id. § 21-3-20(6) (repealed by the SCPC).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(6) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
47. Simonton v. Edmunds, 202 S.C. 397, 25 S.E.2d 284 (1943).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(10) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-3-20 (repealed by the SCPC), 27-19-10 to -30 (1976); see
Gibson v. Rikard, 143 S.C. 402, 141 S.E. 726 (1927).
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Survivorship

The SCPC requires that an heir survive the decedent by 120
hours in order to take an intestate share. The heir (or, in the
usual case, the heir's successor) carries the burden of proving
compliance with the survivorship requirement. The survivorship
requirement is not applicable, however, where the intestate estate would escheat.50 For example, assume that the intestate dies
twenty-four hours before his stepchild, who would have been his
only heir under the SCPC's intestacy scheme. If the SCPC
treated the stepchild as predeceased, the State would take the
entire estate." The survivorship requirement would not apply.
Prior South Carolina law did not impose a survivorship requirement of a stated length of time, but did, of course, require
an heir to survive the decedent for some time period, although
perhaps only an instant, in order to inherit.2

50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-104 (1976). The survivorship requirement of this section
also applies to the exempt property set aside, see infra text accompanying note 240, but
not to testate or anti-lapse situations, nor does the SCPC version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-501 to -508 (1976), contain a 120hour survivorship requirement. Cf. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-601, 8 U.L.A. 128 (1983) (requiring a devisee to survive the testator by 120 hours); id. § 2-605 (also containing a 120hour survivorship requirement).
The SCPC 120-hour survivorship requirement only for intestate estates and the exempt property set aside, but not for testate, anti-lapse, or Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act purposes, can lead to inconsistent dispositive results.
For example, Testator (T) leaves a will which has only one dispositive provision:
One item thereof devises Blackacre (titled solely in T's name) to her husband (H). The
will contains no residuary clause. At her death, T also owns Whiteacre (titled solely in
T's name). T and H die in a car accident, with H surviving T by one hour. After both
deaths, T's only heir is her brother (B); H, who dies intestate, is survived only by his
sister (S). Since H survives T, he takes Blackacre under the will. At H's death, Blackacre
passes to S. Because T's will did not dispose effectively of Whiteacre, it passes by intestacy. The 120-hour survivorship requirement prevents H from taking as an heir. B takes
Whiteacre.
In situations where anti-lapse, exempt property set aside, and the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provisions also apply, the dispositive result can be even more confusing.
See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-501 to -508 (1976).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-105 (1976).
52. See Nolf v. Patton, 114 S.C. 323, 103 S.E. 528 (1920); Pell v. Ball, 15 S.C. Eq.
(Chev. Eq.) 99 (1840). See also the prior South Carolina version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-9-10 to -80 (1976), which has been re-codified by
the SCPC at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-501 to -508 (1976).
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C. Representation
The SCPC provides for unlimited representation. When an
heir predeceases the intestate, his issue take the share he would
have taken if he had survived the decedent.5 3 Calculation and
division of shares is made according to the per capita with per
capita representation method. The estate is divided only at a
generational level at which there is a living taker. Once the
generational level of division is determined, the number of
shares into which the division at that level is made equals the
number of living takers at that generational level plus the number of takers at that generational level who predeceased the intestate leaving issue that survive the decedent. Issue of a predeceased taker take their shares by the same rule of determination
and division.a4

Example 1
Intestate (I) dies, survived by two grandchildren, GC1 and
GC2, the children of I's predeceased child C1, and by two greatgrandchildren, GGC1 and GGC2 (the children of I's predeceased
grandchild GC3, the child of I's predeceased child, C2). Under
the SCPC method of representation, division of the estate is
made at the grandchild generational level since there is no surviving taker at the child generational level. The number of
shares into which the estate is divided totals three: The number
of living takers at that level (GC1 and GC2) plus the number of
predeceased takers leaving surviving issue (GC3). GC1 and GC2
each take one-third of the estate. Of course, GC3 cannot inherit
since she predeceased the intestate, but her children (GGC1 and
GGC2), divide her share by representation.

53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103 (1976). Used herein, the term "heir" means one who
would have inherited from the intestate if he had survived the intestate.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-106 (1976).
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Example 1
I

C1

C2

F I
GCI
1/3

GC3

GC2
1/3

1

GGC1
1/6

GGC2
1/6

Prior South Carolina law allowed unlimited representation
by issue in only one situation. Issue of predeceased children of
the intestate took "the share or shares to which their parents
would have been entitled had such parent survived the intestate."5 The specific language of this section required a strict per
stirpital method of representation in determining the calculation
and division of shares. Under the strict per stirpes method, the
estate was divided at every generational level regardless of
whether there was a living taker at that generational level. The
number of shares into which the division at that level was made
equaled the number of living takers at that generational level
plus the number of takers at that generational level who predeceased the intestate leaving issue surviving the decedent. Issue
of a predeceased taker 6took his share by the same rule of deter5
mination and division.

55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). Used herein, unlimited representation means that issue of a predeceased heir may take the share of that
predeceased heir regardless of the generational level of the issue. Limited representation
restricts representation by issue to only certain specified generational levels.
56. See Stent v. M'Leod, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) 354 (1827).
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Example 2
Thus, under the same facts as in Example 1, prior South
Carolina law provided for the strict per stirpital method of representation, with division of the estate at the child generational
level even though there was no surviving taker at that generational level. The number of shares into which the estate was divided totaled two: The number of living takers at that level
(none) plus the number of predeceased takers leaving surviving
issue (Cl and C2). The estate was divided again at the
grandchild generational level. Cl's share was divided into two
shares: The sum of living takers at the grandchild level (two)
plus the number of predeceased takers at that level leaving surviving issue (none). GC1 and GC2 each took one-half of Cl's
one-half, or one-fourth of the total estate. GC3 would have
taken C2's share in its entirety had she survived, but since she
predeceased the intestate, her issue inherited her share. GGC1
and GGC2 each took one-half of the C2/GC3 share, or onefourth of the entire estate.
Example 2

I

I

C1

GC1
1/4

C2

GC3

GC2
1/4

1

GGC1
1/4
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Prior South Carolina law allowed limited representation in
only two situations.5 7 Whole-blood nieces and nephews of the
decedent took the share their predeceased parent (decedent's
whole-blood sibling) would have taken if she had survived the
intestate.5 8 First cousins of the intestate took the share their
parent (decedent's uncle and aunt) would have taken if he or she
59
had survived the decedent.
Because the method of representation changes under the
SCPC, the estate planner should be wary of a trap. If, prior to
the SCPC, a lawyer has drafted a will using a shorthand term of
art such as "by representation," "per stirpes," "issue," or
"heirs," the result attained under the new Code may differ from
the client's intent.60
D. Half-Blood Kindred
The SCPC allows, with one exception, half-blood kindred of
the decedent to take a share of the intestate estate in the same
manner and share as whole-blood kindred.6 1 The SCPC retains,
however, the preference for whole-blood siblings over half-blood
siblings of the intestate.2 Even more intriguing, and confusing,

57. Used herein, unlimited representation means that issue of a predeceased heir
may take the share of that predeceased heir regardless of the generational level of the
issue. Limited representation restricts representation by issue to only certain specified
generational levels.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC); see supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(6) (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
60. Use of these terms may require reference to the statutory sections governing
intestacy for definition. See, e.g., Pate v. Ford, No. 0935 (S.C. App. Apr. 13, 1987), modified, - S.C. -, 360 S.E.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1987), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 0935 (S.C.
Sept. 21, 1987); Bonney v. Granger, 292 S.C. 308, 356 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1987); see
also, e.g., Alley v. Strickland, 279 S.C. 126, 302 S.E.2d 866 (1983); Irvin v. Brown, 160
S.C. 374, 158 S.E. 733 (1931); Allen v. Allen, 13 S.C. 512 (1879); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 303 (1940). Since the SCPC changes the method of representation under intestacy, a will which uses these shorthand terms, and which was drafted under prior law,
may no longer accomplish the client's objectives. The estate planner should consider specifically defining these terms to suit the particular purposes of his clients, especially
when the client prefers distribution in a manner which varies from the distribution system of the intestacy provisions of the Code.
The operation of S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-106 (1976) in conjunction with the disclaimer provisions of S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-801 (1976) can create a different type of trap
(or opportunity). See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-107 (1976).

62. Id. For the prior South Carolina law, see infra text accompanying notes 68-74. A
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is the SCPC treatment of issue of siblings of the half or whole
blood. If the intestate is survived by any whole-blood sibling,
neither a half-blood sibling nor the issue of a predeceased halfblood sibling may take. Yet, if no whole-blood sibling survives
the decedent, but issue of a whole-blood sibling survive, then the
whole-blood issue will share the estate with any surviving halfblood sibling or their issue by representation. 3 The survival of a
whole-blood sibling triggers the discriminatory effect of Code
section 62-2-107.e4 The operation of the section can lead to interesting, albeit perhaps indefensible, results.
Example 3
Intestate () is survived by WB, a whole-blood brother (the
son of I's parents M and F), and by HS1 and HS2, sisters of the
half blood (the daughters of I's mother, M, and I's stepfather,
SF). The whole-blood brother takes the entire estate to the exclusion of the half sisters.
Example 3
SF

M

F

I

WB
(all)

HS1

HS2

proponent of this retained discrimination for whole-blood siblings at the expense of halfblood siblings should be hard pressed to defend the practice. The discrimination under
prior law resulted both from antiquated ideas about the relationships of whole blood to
half blood and from the haphazard manner of amendment by which the intestacy statute
in its most recent form evolved. Even if rationale exist for the preference of whole-blood
heirs to half-blood heirs, the singling out at the sibling level for this practice remains
enigmatic. Note that prior South Carolina law did not discriminate except at the sibling
level (and their issue) and then only in intestate, but not testate, situations. Because of
the operation of S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-609 (1976), the preference for whole-blood siblings will now extend into testate situations. This departure from prior law renders unconvincing one possible argument for the SCPC practice of retention: that of continuity.
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-107 (1976). For the treatment of siblings' issue under the
prior law, see infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-107 (1976).
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Example 4
Intestate (I) is survived by her nieces, NI and N2, daughters of her predeceased whole-blood brother, WB, and by HS1
and HS2, her half sisters. The nieces share the estate with the
two half sisters. HS1 and HS2 each take one-third of the estate,
6
and NI and N2 each take one-sixth by representation. Because
no whole-blood sibling survives, there is no trigger of the preference for the whole blood.
Example 4

I

I

I_

HSI

WB

1/3

NI
1/6

'!!

I
HS2
1/3

N2

1/6

Example 5
Intestate (I) is survived by her nieces, Ni and N2 (the
daughters of her predeceased whole-blood brother, WB), by
niece N3 (the daughter of her predeceased half-blood sister,
HS1), and by niece N4 (the daughter of her predeceased halfblood sister, HS2). The nieces all share in the estate by representation." Each takes one-fourth.

65. See supra subpart II.C.
66. See id.
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HS1

HS2

N3
1/4

N4
1/4

l ! i
N2
1/4

N1
1/4

Example 6

Intestate (I) is survived by nieces Ni and N2 (daughters of
her predeceased whole-blood brother WB), by WS (a wholeblood sister), and by half-blood sisters HSI and HS2. N1, N2,
and WS share the estate to the exclusion of HS1 and HS2, beExample 6

F

M

I

N1
1/4

WB

WS

F_I I
HSI

HS2

N2

1/4
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cause the survival of the whole-blood sister triggers the discriminatory effect of SCPC section 62-2-107. WS takes one-half of the
estate, and NI and N2 each take one-fourth by representation."
Prior South Carolina law allowed half-blood kindred to take
a share of the intestate estate in the same manner and share as
whole-blood kindred, except Code section 21-3-20 preferred
whole-blood siblings of the decedent and their children to halfblood siblings and their children."' If the decedent was survived
by whole-blood siblings and by half-blood siblings, the wholeblood siblings shared the estate to the exclusion of the halfblood siblings."" Children, but no other issue, of predeceased
whole-blood siblings (i.e., nieces and nephews of the decedent)
received the share their parent would have taken had that parent survived."0 No issue of predeceased half-blood siblings received a share of the estate at this level.7 1 If the decedent was
survived only by whole-blood nieces or nephews and by halfblood brothers or sisters, these survivors shared in the estate. 2
The nieces and nephews divided the share their parent would
have taken had that parent survived. 3
Example 7
Intestate (I) was survived by her nieces N1 and N2 (daughters of her predeceased whole-blood brother WB), and by HS1
and HS2, her half sisters. The nieces shared the estate with the
two half sisters. HS1 and HS2 each took a third, and NI and N2
each took a sixth by representation. 4

67. See id. NI and N2 step into the shoes of their predeceased parent WB and take
the share he would have taken had he survived the intestate.
68. See S.C. Code Ann. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Stent v. M'Leod, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) 354 (1827).
71. Ex parte Mays, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich. Eq.) 61 (1845); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20
(1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
73. Id. In Felder v. Felder, 26 S.C. Eq. (5 Rich. Eq.) 509 (1853), the defendants
argued that the statute called for an equal distribution such that each child of a predeceased whole-blood sibling took the same share as each half blood-sibling (a per capita
division). The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the clear language of the statute
required the whole-blood nieces and nephews to divide the share their predeceased parent would have taken (i.e., a per stirpital division).
74. Felder v. Felder, 26 S.C. Eq. (5 Rich. Eq.) 509 (1853).
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Example 7

F

M

IWB

N1
1/6

HS1
1/3

1i
HS2

1/3

N2
1/6

E. Afterborn Children
The SCPC provides that issue of the intestate who were
conceived before but born after the death of the intestate inherit
as though they were born prior to the intestate's death.7 5 The
Code does not, however, afford similar treatment to issue of persons other than the intestate who are conceived before but born
after the intestate.7
Example 8
Intestate (I) dies on June 1, 1988. I is survived by one child,
C1. A second child, C2, was conceived on March 1, 1988, and is
born on December 1, 1988. C2 shares in I's estate to the same
extent as C1.

75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (1976).
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (1976) excludes expressly the issue of decedents other

than the intestate.
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Example 9
Intestate (I) dies on June 1, 1988. I is survived by one
nephew, N1, the son of his predeceased brother B (who died
May 1, 1988). A second nephew, N2, was conceived on March 1,
1988, and is born on December 1, 1988. N2 will not share in I's
estate.
Prior South Carolina cases followed the common-law rule
that treated children of the intestate conceived before but born
after the death of the intestate as though they were born prior
to the intestate's death.77 No South Carolina cases dealt specifically with the treatment of afterborn issue of a person other
78
than the intestate.
F.

Adopted Children

For intestacy purposes, the SCPC treats an adopted child as
the child of the adoptive parents and not as the child of the
natural parents, except in the case of a stepchild adoption.7 9 A
stepchild adoption occurs when a natural parent is married to
the adoptive parent. In stepchild adoption situations, the SCPC
treats the adopted child as the child of the adoptive parent and
of the natural parent married to the adoptive parent, but not as
the child of the natural parent not married to the adoptive
parent.8 0

77. See Pearson v. Carlton, 18 S.C. 47 (1882). For examples of the similar commonlaw treatment of afterborn children of the decedent, see Byerly v. Tolbert, 250 N.C. 27,
108 S.E.2d 29 (1959); Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907); 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 129. See also T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 75-96 (2d ed. 1953). For a discussion of an analogous treatment of afterborn children for purposes of vesting under the
rule against perpetuities, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.4 comment d
(1983) (donative transfers).
78. The common law extended this inclusionary treatment of afterborns to the issue
of any decedent who would have been an heir had he survived the intestate. See Byerly
v. Tolbert, 250 N.C. 27, 108 S.E.2d 29 (1959); Reeve v. Long, 3 Lev. 408, 83 Eng. Rep.
754 (K.B. 1695); see also T. ATKINSON, supra note 77, at 52-3, 75-6; 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 77, at 129. For a discussion of an analogous treatment of afterborn children
for purposes of vesting under the rule against perpetuities, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY § 1.4 comment d (1983) (donative transfers). The SCPC reverses the common-law rule with respect to issue of decedents other than the intestate.
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109(1) (1976).
80. Id. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-113 (1976), a person who can inherit through
two lines of relationship to the decedent is entitled only to the larger share.
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Example 10
C is the natural child of NM (mother) and NF (father). NF
and NM get a divorce, whereupon NM remarries. Her new husband (AF) adopts C. For intestacy purposes, C is the child of
NM and AF, but not of NF.
The Code does not specify the requirements necessary for
the recognition of an adoption as valid or final.8 ' The pertinent
South Carolina law found outside the SCPC will continue to determine when an adoption is valid.8"
Prior South Carolina law also treated an adopted child as
the child of the adoptive parents and not as the child of the
natural parents, except in the case of a stepchild adoption." In
stepchild adoption situations, prior law presumably treated the
adopted child as the child of the adoptive parent and of the natural parent married to the adoptive parent, but not as the child
of the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent.8 4
G.

Illegitimate Children

For inheritance purposes, the SCPC considers an illegitimate child as the child of the mother in every case and of the
father only in certain situations.8 ' The illegitimate child is the
child of the father if the parents participated in a wedding cere86
mony (regardless of whether the attempted marriage is valid)

81. But see the definitions of child, issue, and parent at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201
(1976).
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976) provides that, unless displaced by the provisions of the Code, the principles of law and equity supplement the Code. Under S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (1976), an adoption is effective only upon the issuance of a decree. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1825 (as enacted by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 (S.530))
recognizes the validity of the adoption of an adult for inheritance purposes only if in the
best interests of all the parties.
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (1976).
84. Id. Prior to its amendment (see 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 (S.530); 1986 S.C.
Acts 3023, No. 464; 1986 S.C. Acts 34, No. 539), this section was perhaps ambiguous,
literally reading that the exclusion of the natural parent in favor of the adoptive parent
applied even to the natural parent married to the adoptive parent. It is improbable that
the literal reading of that section produced a true understanding of the intent of the
legislature. See C. KARESH, WILLS 5 (1977). As to the effective date of an adoption, see
supra note 82.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (1976).
86. If the attempted marriage is valid, then the child is not illegitimate. S.C. CODE
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or if paternity is established by adjudication. To establish paternity, the adjudicatory proceeding must commence before or
within six months after the death of the putative father.87 If the
proceeding to adjudicate paternity commences after the death of
the putative father, the Code imposes a stricter standard of clear
and convincing proof.8 8 When adjudication establishes paternity,
the SCPC prohibits a putative father or his kindred from inheriting from or through a child unless the father has openly
treated the child as his and has not refused to support the

child."s
The most recent prior South Carolina law effectively considered the illegitimate child to be a child of the mother." The
child was also considered a child of the father if an adjudication
established paternity during the father's lifetime or if the father

§ 62-2-109 (1976) applies only to illegitimates; the legitimizing factors under prior
South Carolina law remain in effect. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976), which provides that, unless displaced by the Code, the principles of law and of equity shall supplement the Code. Some examples of legitimizing factors include the subsequent marriage
of the parents, the conception of children pursuant to a marriage contracted for after the
disappearance for five years of the spouse of one of the parties to the marriage, and the
conception of children pursuant to a marriage between a bigamist and one unaware of
the bigamy. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-50, -60, -90 (1976).
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (1976). For a thorough consideration of the tension
between the need to ensure reliable evidence in establishing paternity and certainty in
probate matters and the need to protect the rights of the illegitimate child, see, e.g.,
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (full
opinion of New York Court of Appeals in In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 481
(1977)). An important issue in these cases concerns the time during which the illegitimate child may bring an action to adjudicate paternity.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (1976) obviously imposes this stricter standard since
the deceased putative father cannot rebut personally the evidence of paternity.
89. Id. This fairness provision prevents a father from refusing to acknowledge the
existence of his child or denying his obligation of support, yet being able to receive a
windfall if the child predeceases the father. This provision should also serve to prevent
the proliferation of fraudulent claims upon the death of a fatherless child.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-30 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). More precisely, the
combined effect of S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-3-30 and -40 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC)
treated the child as the child of the mother in all cases except with respect to inheritance
by the child by and through that child's maternal relatives and by that child's maternal
relatives from and through that child. The limitation with respect to maternal relatives
did not apply if escheat to the state would otherwise result. Note that an illegitimate
child derives the right to inherit from its mother only by statute. The common law did
not recognize the illegitimate as anyone's child. Nor did the Statute of Descent and Distribution afford the right to the child. See Gibson v. Rikard, 143 S.C. 402, 141 S.E. 726
(1927); Barwick v. Miller, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 434 (1814). Note also that the statutes
regarding illegitimacy were inapplicable if the child was legitimized according to recognized factors. See supra note 86.
ANN.
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acknowledged paternity in writing.9 1 Similar to the SCPC, prior
South Carolina law prohibited inheritance by the father from
the child unless adjudication established paternity during the
child's lifetime and the father provided reasonable support during the last three years of the child's minority.2
H.

Aliens

The SCPC allows an alien to take as an heir without limitation. 3 Prior South Carolina law generally allowed an alien to
take as an heir without limitation, 94 except to the extent it imposed a limit of 500,000 acres on the amount of land owned by
an alien or an alien-controlled corporation. 5
L

Effect of Lifetime Transactions with the Intestate
1.

Advancements

The SCPC provides that a lifetime transfer from an intestate to an heir is chargeable as an advancement only if a writing
indicates the intestate's intent to make an advancement.9 " Either a writing made by the intestate contemporaneously with
the gift or a written acknowledgment by the heir will suffice to
render the gift an advancement. The property advanced is valued as of the time the heir took possession or enjoyment of it or
as of the time of the decedent's death, whichever occurs first. If
the recipient of the property dies before the decedent, the property is charged against the recipient's issue, unless the writing

91. In Wilson v. Jones, 281 S.C. 230, 314 S.E.2d 341 (1984), the supreme court determined that § 21-3-30, which at that time prohibited inheritance by an illegitimate
child from the father, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution. Subsequently, the legislature amended that section,
allowing the illegitimate child the opportunity, although limited, to establish paternity
through adjudication, in concordance with the spirit of Lalli and Trimble.
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-30 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-112 (1976).
94. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-1-40 (repealed by the SCPC), 27-13-10, -20, -30, -40 (1976).
95. Id. § 27-13-30.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-110 (1976). An advancement is an intention by one who
will die intestate to make a lifetime gift to an heir, the value of the gift to be charged
against the intestate share of that heir. For a discussion of the operative elements of an
advancement, see infra note 98.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss4/2

24

Medlin: Selective Substantive Provisions of the South Carolina Probate Co

19871

SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATE CODE

635

provides otherwise.9 7
Prior South Carolina law treated property transferred by an
intestate during his lifetime to his issue as an advancement depending not on intent, but rather on the nature of the gift."8 The
advancement was valued as of the date of death, although with
relation to the condition of the gift at the time of the transfer."
If the child receiving the advancement predeceased the intestate, the advancement was chargeable against any share of the
e
estate received by the child's issue 100

97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-110 (1976).
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-60 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC); see Heyward v. Middleton, 65 S.C. 493, 43 S.E. 956 (1903); Rees v. Rees, 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 86 (1859);
Youngblood v. Norton, 20 S.C. Eq. (1 Strob. Eq.) 122 (1845).
At common law, a lifetime transfer to an heir by a person who would die intestate
would constitute an advancement regardless of intent. Today, most states by statute
have reversed this result; such a transfer is not an advancement unless proof exists of
intent to the contrary. Examples of transfers considered in"South Carolina as advancements are cancellation or payment of a debt, see Rees v. Rees, 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.)
86 (1859), and life insurance policies, see Rickenbaker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110 (1878).
Examples of transfers not treated as advancements include those for education, see
White v. Moore 23 S.C. 456 (1885); Cooner v. May, 22 S.C. Eq. (3 Strob. Eq.) 185 (1849),
or for valuable consideration, see Murrell v. Murrell, 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 148
(1848).
The theory of an advancement was that a parent intended to treat his children
equally. M'Caw v. Blewit, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) (1827) 90; Ex parte Lawton, 3 S.C.
Eq. (3 Des.) 199 (1811). If that child wished to share in the intestate estate, he had to
add, for accounting purposes, the value of the advancement back to an augmented estate
known as hotchpot. Hotchpot consisted of the probate estate less debts, taxes, and the
surviving spouse's share, plus the value of all advancements. The shares of the children
were calculated so that, taking into consideration the amount of the advancement to a
child, each child received an equal amount of hotchpot (representing the total amount of
property received by the intestate's children during his life and because of his death).
See Lawton, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) at 200-02. If the child did not wish to share in the estate,
he did not have to add his advancement to hotchpot. Newton v. Boggs, 274 S.C. 268, 262
S.E.2d 741 (1980); Hamer v. Hamer, 23 S.C. Eq. (4 Strob. Eq.) 124 (1850). He could
share in the estate and not add his advancement to hotchpot if his siblings knew of the
advancement but did not require him to add to hotchpot. This conduct would constitute
a waiver of their rights. Miley v. Deer, 93 S.C. 66, 76 S.E. 27 (1912).
Example
I dies intestate with three children (C1, C2, and C3) and no spouse surviving him. He made a $15,000 lifetime advancement to C1. His probate estate
after debts and taxes totals $60,000. C1 wishes to share in the estate so he adds
the $15,000 to hotchpot, which totals $75,000 [$60,000 plus $15,000]. C2 and
C3 each take $25,000 of the probate estate; C1 takes $10,000. Thus, each has
received effectively $25,000 from the testator.
99. M'Caw v. Blewitt, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) 90 (1827); Ex parte Glenn, 20 S.C.
64 (1883).
100. McLure v. Steele, 35 S.C. Eq. (14 Rich. Eq.) 105 (1868); Rees v. Rees, 32 S.C.
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2. Debts to Decedents
The SCPC allows charging a debt owed by an heir to the
intestate decedent against that heir's intestate share, but not
against the shares of that heir's issue if the heir should predecease the intestate. 01' Thus, the SCPC codifies prior South Carolina law. 1 2
III. WILLS
A.

Requirements for Validity
1. Age

The SCPC requires that a testator be at least eighteen years
of age to execute a will. The minimum age limitation is inapplicable to married testators.' 0 '
Prior South Carolina law also required that a testator be
limitation
eighteen years old. Under prior law, however, the age
0 4
applied even if the underage testator was married.
2. Capacity
The SCPC requires that a testator be of sound mind in order to execute a valid will.1° 5 The Code does not specify the factors involved in determining the soundness of the testator's
mind. Thus, existing South Carolina law addressing the determination of testamentary capacity should continue to be effective. 06 South Carolina enjoys a relatively rich body of case law
dealing with such matters of testamentary capacity as mental
capacity,10 7 undue influence, 08 monomania or insane delusion, 09
Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 86 (1859).
101. S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 62-2-111

(1976).

102. See Ex parte Wilson, 84 S.C. 444, 67 S.E. 560 (1910); Stokes v. Stokes, 62 S.C.
346, 40 S.E. 662 (1902); Sartor v. Beaty, 25 S.C. 293 (1886); Wilson v. Kelly, 16 S.C. 216

(1881).

103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-501 (1976).
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-10 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
105. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 62-2-501 (1976).
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976), which provides that, unless displaced by
the Code, the principles of law and of equity shall supplement the Code.
107. McCollum v. Banks, 213 S.C. 476, 50 S.E.2d 199 (1948); Moorer v. Bull 212 S.C.
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fraud, 110 and mistake."'
Prior South Carolina law also required that a testator be of
sound mind." 2
3. Execution
The technical execution requirements imposed by the SCPC
1 4
are basically three-fold. 113 First, the will must be in writing.
Second, the testator, or his proxy at his direction and in his
presence, must sign the will." 5 Last, two persons must witness
either the signature of the testator, or of his proxy, or an ac146, 46 S.E.2d 681 (1948); Sumter Trust Co. v. Holman, 134 S.C. 412, 132 S.E. 811
(1926); Matheson v. Matheson, 125 S.C. 165, 118 S.E. 312 (1923); Kirkwood v. Gordon,
41 S.C.L. (7 Rich.) 474 (1854); Tomkins v. Tomkins, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bailey) 92 (1828); Lee
v. Lee's Ex'rs, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 183 (1827). See generally Figg, Of Carolina Quiddities, Quillets and Cases, 18 S.C.L. REv. 719, 727 (1966); Means, Estate Planningand the
Law of Wills and Inheritance for South Carolina Farmers, 12 S.C.LoQ. 491, 531 (1960).
108. In re Estate of Hicks, 284 S.C. 462, 327 S.E.2d 345 (1985); Byrd v. Byrd, 279
S.C. 425, 308 S.E.2d 788 (1983); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 277 S.C. 527, 290 S.E.2d 415 (1982);
Mock v. Dowling, 266 S.C. 274, 222 S.E.2d 773 (1976); Smith v. Whetstone, 209 S.C. 78,
39 S.E.2d 127 (1946); Means v. Means, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 167 (1850); Floyd v. Floyd, 34
S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 44 (1848); Farr v. Thompson, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 37 (1839).
109. Although not an independent ground for overturning a will in South Carolina,
this is a factor to be considered in the overall determination of testamentary capacity.
Havird v. Schissell, 252 S.C. 404, 166 S.E.2d 801 (1969); Evans v. Bates, 212 S.C. 379, 46
S.E.2d 287 (1948); Sumter Trust Co. v. Holman, 134 S.C.412, 132 S.E. 811 (1926).
110. Myers v. O'Hanlan, 33 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.) 196 (1861); Floyd v. Floyd, 34
S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 44 (1848); see Means, supra note 107, at 532.
111. Ex parte King, 132 S.C. 63, 128 S.E. 850 (1925); Whitlock v. Wardlaw, 41
S.C.L. (7 Rich.) 453 (1854); see Means, supra note 107, at 531.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-10 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976).
114. Id. The SCPC does not provide specifically that a typewritten document qualifies as a writing. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-1-10 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC) specifically
qualified a typewritten document as a writing. Presumably, modern convention should
suffice to recognize typewritten as written even without express statutory authorization.
The SCPC does not recognize any exceptions to the requirement that a will must be
written in order to be validly executed. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23 for a
discussion of exceptions under prior South Carolina law. The strict SCPC requirement of
a writing possibly does not eliminate completely the possibility of probating an oral will
in this state: the Code accepts for probate in South Carolina wills validly executed in
another state and wills admitted to probate in another state. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-3303(d), -408 (1976). S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-303(d) (1976) requires the deposit of an authenticated copy of a will probated elsewhere. Whether an authenticated copy of a will
includes a copy of the reduction to writing of an oral will probated elsewhere is problematic. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-7-1110 to -1140 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976). The SCPC imposes no requirements as to
where on the will the testator must sign.
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knowledgement by the testator of his signature or of his will. 1 6
The Code does not require that the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator or of each other; nor 1does
it specify a time at
7
or by which either witness must attest.

Example 11
Testator (T) types and signs his will in private. A week
later, he acknowledges his signature to W1 (a witness), who does
not attest at that time. A month thereafter, he acknowledges his
will to W2 (a witness), who does not see T's signature nor does
he sign at that time. Six months later, W1 privately affixes his
116. Id. The specification in the Code that a witness can attest to the testator's
acknowledgement of either his will or his signature clarifies a gray area under previous
South Carolina law. See infra note 126. Although July 1, 1987, is the general effective
date of the Code, the legislature retroactively applied for wills executed on or after June
28, 1984, the requirement for only two witnesses. See infra note 145.
The Code does not specify the degree of competency, if any, required for a witness.
Compare infra text accompanying notes 130-32. The Code, however, probably implies a
requirement of witness competency since the witness may have to testify before the probate court (or before an officer of the court if the will is self-proved). See S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 62-1-103, 3-405, -406 (1976).
The Code does not recognize as validly executed a holographic will, i.e., an unwitnessed but signed will in the handwriting of the testator. For examples of the myriad
problems which can arise in states which recognize holographic wills, see Lorenzo v.
Howard, 708 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1985); Kaufhold v. McIver, 682 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); In re Estate of Cunningham, 198 N.J. Super. 484, 487 A.2d 777 (1984). The SCPC
nonrecognition of holographic wills may not eliminate completely the possibility of probating such a will in this state: the Code accepts for probate in South Carolina wills
validly executed in another state and wills admitted to probate in another state. See S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 62-3-303(d), -408 (1976).
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976). The Nebraska Supreme Court, in interpreting that state's similar version of Uniform Probate Code § 2-502, held that the attestation by the witnesses three months after the death of the testator was not timely, despite
the lack of express requirements in that section. Newell v. Flicker, 215 Neb. 495, 339
N.W.2d 914 (1983); see also Painter v. Mikaska, 140 Mich. App. 116, 362 N.W.2d 906
(1985). These rulings seem to recognize a couple of the oft-stated policy reasons for requiring the witnessing of wills, i.e., that of preventing fraud (or undue influence) and of
ensuring reliability of the evidence. See Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Trarfers,51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941). Under prior South Carolina law, a witness attested both
to the signature of the testator and to his capacity. The SCPC apparently may require
similar averments from the witness. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976) with
respect to attestation and self-proving wills; for the exception for lack of capacity in §
62-3.406 to the presumption of validity afforded self-proved wills, see S.C. CODE ANN. §
62.3-406 comment (1976). Query as to whether a failure to judicially impose a reasonable
time limit for attestation (as in Flicker) lessens the ability of a witness to testify as to
capacity at the time the testator executes the will.
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signature to the will. Ten months later, W2 signs. T then dies.
The SCPC presumably would uphold the will as properly
executed.
Prior South Carolina law imposed more stringent execution
requirements. 118 First, the will must have been in writing," 9 with
several exceptions. In certain deathbed situations, the testator
could bequeath personal property by an oral or nuncupative
will.' 20 The law also allowed a soldier in military service or a
seaman at sea to bequeath his personal property as he could at
common law.' 21 South Carolina would admit into probate a will
that had been validly executed in another state 122 or that previously had been admitted into probate in another state. 2 '
Second, the testator, or his proxy at his direction and in his
presence, must have signed the will. 1 24 Any writing on the testamentary document intended as the signature of the testator, re12 5
gardless of the location, served as a signature.
Last, three witnesses must have witnessed the testator sign
the will or the testator acknowledge his signature.' 26 The wit-

118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
119. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-1-10 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC) specifically quali-

fied a typewritten document as a writing.
120. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-7-1110 to -1140 (1976) (repealed by the
SCPC). A testator could bequeath a total of $50 or less of personal property without
complying with the provisions of these sections. To bequeath personalty valued at more
than $50, the testator had to communicate his will to three witnesses, whom he bade to
bear witness, during his final illness and in the place he would die. The will had to be
proved within six months after the testator's utterance thereof, unless the witnesses had
reduced the contents to writing within six days of the utterance, in which event the will
could be proved within twelve months.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-60 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC); see Morgan v. United
States, 13 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1926). This section allowed a qualifying soldier or sailor to
dispose of personal property by oral will (with the obvious requirement of a witness).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-70 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-910 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
125. Denton v. English, 9 S.C.L (2 Mill) 391 (1818).
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). Prior South Carolina
law was unclear about whether the witnessing requirements would be met if the witnesses observed the testator acknowledge his will without actually seeing his signature.
Some cases discuss proving the signature of the testator. See, e.g., Kaufman v.
Caughman, 49 S.C. 159, 27 S.E. 16 (1897). But see Tucker v. Oxner, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.)
141,(1849), in which the court at one point recognizes that a witness can observe "the
acknowledgement of the testator that it is his handwriting-his will, &c. is a sufficient
attestation

. .

." (emphasis added), but later in the opinion holds the will improperly

witnessed because the witness "did not see the testatrix sign the will either by writing
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nesses had to sign in the
presence of the testator and in the
12 7
presence of each other.

(a) Witness Competency
The SCPC does not contain express provisions with respect
to any generally required credibility of witnesses, but a requirement of competency (tantamount to credibility under the previous law) may be implied since the witness must testify before
the probate court or, if the will is self-proved, before an officer of
the court. 128 The SCPC prohibits a beneficiary under a will from
receiving more than he would have without the will if he or his
spouse served as a witness. The Code does not affect, however,
the competency of the interested witness. 12 9
Prior South Carolina law required the witnesses to the will
to be "credible,"1 30 which case law equated with "competent" to
testify in a court of law.' 3 ' Previous law provided that a witness
her name in his presence or by any subsequent acknowledgement of her signature.
See also C. KARESH, supra note 84, at 30. The SCPC clarifies this gray area.
Prior law did not recognize as validly executed a holographic will, (an unwitnessed
but signed will in the handwriting of the testator). The nonrecognition of a holographic
will may not eliminate completely the possibility of probating such a will in this State:
the prior law accepted for probate in South Carolina wills-validly executed in another
state and wills admitted to probate in another state. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-3-303(d), 408 (1976).
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). Thus, to validly witness a will in South Carolina, the testator and all the witnesses had to be present at the
same time at which the witnesses attested the will. South Carolina used the line-of-sight
test to define presence for this purpose: the witnesses and the testator must have been
able to see each witness sign. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 28 S.C.L. (1 Speers) 253 (1843). If,
however, the testator or a witness was blind, the pertinent standard became that of conscious presence, i.e., the blind testator or witness was able through any sense to "observe" the attestation. Ray v. Hill, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 297 (1848); Reynolds v. Reynolds,
28 S.C.L. (1 Speers) 253 (1843).
128. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976), which provides that, unless displaced by
the provisions of the Code, the principles of law and equity supplement the Code. See
also supra note 116.
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (1976). The Code does allow an interested witness to
receive a fee for serving in an office (e.g., executor or trustee) to which the will appoints
him.
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
131. See Taylor v. Taylor, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 531 (1845). Of course, the witness
needed to be credible at the time of attestation. Noble v. Burnett, 42 S.C.L. (10 Rich.)
531 (1857). The law imposed no express minimum age standards, religious belief requirements, nor automatic prohibitions against convicted criminals (except for perjury or subornation of perjury). S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-10, -20 (1976). The existence of a criminal
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who was a beneficiary or the spouse of a beneficiary was not rendered incompetent by this interest, but that beneficiary could
not take more under the will than he would have taken without
the will.' 32
(b)

Self-Proof

The SCPC introduces into South Carolina the concept of
the self-proving will. 3 3 A will is self-proved when the testator
and the witnesses acknowledge by oath to an officer authorized
to take oaths (for example, a notary public) that (1) the testator
(or his proxy) signed willingly, freely, and voluntarily-free of
constraint and undue influence, (2) the testator was at least
eighteen years old and of sound mind, and (3) the witnesses at134
tested in the presence and within the hearing of the testator.
The self-proof may occur in one step (simultaneous with the execution and thus serving as the self-proof of the will as well as
the attestation) or two steps (subsequent to the execution, i.e.,
in addition to the "traditional" method of attestation).' 35 A will
that is properly self-proved generally relieves the proponent of
the will at probate from producing one or more witnesses to the
court. ' 6 If the will is not self-proved, however, the Code may
record could serve to impeach 'a witness's credibility. Recently, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals found that the subsequent enactment of S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-60 (1976)
repealed one of the Code sections that rendered a witness previously convicted of perjury
not credible, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-10 (1976), but did not address the Code section
with respect to subornation of perjury, see id. § 16-9-20. See State v. Merriman, 287 S.C.
74, 337 S.E.2d 218 (1985).
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-690 (1976) (recodifled with amendments at § 62-2-504).
Nor could an interested witness receive a fee for serving in an office (e.g., executor or
trustee) to which the will appoints him.
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976). Actually S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-615 (1976)
(effective June 28, 1984) provided similarly. Although intended as a section of the overall
SCPC, it was enacted separately. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976) recodifies § 21-7-615.
See infra note 145.
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976). A witness may also serve as the notary public. Id. § 62-2-503(c) (as added by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 (S.530)).
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976). The two-step process is appropriate even for
wills executed prior to the enactment of this section. Some practitioners may consider it
prudent to use the two-step process for all execution ceremonies, at least until more
comfortable with the self-proof process, so that even if the self-proving section is executed improperly, the will retains its validity.
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-3-405, -406 (1976). The self-proof of a will may not
obviate the need for a witness's testimony before the court in the event of grounds of
attack other than the proper execution thereof: fraud, undue influence, duress, lack of
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require the will to be "proved" by the oath of at least one

witness.

13 7

The careful practitioner should observe that some of the
averments contained in the self-proving forms do not correlate
necessarily with the SCPC requirements for valid will execution
found in section 62-2-502.138 The suggested forms contain averments that the witness signed in the presence of the testator, 3 9
and that the witness signed within the hearing of the testator. '" °
The suggested forms do not contain averments that the proxy
for the testator, if any, signed for him in his presence; "1 ' that the
testator is younger than eighteen but married; 142 and that the
witnesses signed in the presence of each other. 143 Since lawyers
use attestation clauses in general, and the self-proving forms in

testamentary capacity, mistake, or revocation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-406 comment
(1976).
137. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-3-405, -406 (1976). Note that S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3303(c) (1976) allows a court in an informal probate proceeding to probate without further proof a will which appears to have the required signatures and an attestation clause
which indicates an execution in compliance with the Code's requirements. A properly
self-proved will should pass muster under § 62-3-303(c).
138. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976); see also supra text accompanying notes
113-17.
139. For valid will execution, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976) does not require that
the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator. See supra text accompanying notes
113-17.
140. For valid will execution, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976) does not require that
the witnesses sign in the hearing of the testator. See supra text accompanying notes 11317.
141. For valid will execution by a testator's proxy, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976)
requires that the proxy sign in the testator's presence and at the testator's direction. See
supra text accompanying note 115.
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-501 (1976) recognizes an exception to the general age
requirement for testamentary capacity if the underage testator is married. See supra
text accompanying note 103.
143. For valid will execution, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976) does not require that
the witnesses sign in the presence of each other. Because the two step self-proving procedure allows the self-proof of a will executed under the requirements of prior law, however, witness presence may have been necessary for validity. A will executed under prior
law would have been valid only if the witnesses attested within the presence of each
other, although the subsequent self-proof thereof occurred after enactment of S.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-7-615 (Supp. 1986) or S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976). In that event, the
averments contained in the self-proving model form would not correspond with the execution requirements in effect and complied with at the time of the signing of the will.
Even though the SCPC does not require that the witnesses sign in the presence of each
other, many lawyers may continue this practice. In that event, the averments contained
in the self-proving model would not correspond with the conduct of the execution
ceremony.
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particular, to corroborate that the execution ceremony complied
with the requisite formalities for valid execution under applicable law, the practitioner presiding over the execution ceremony
may consider amending the self-proving form so that it more accurately reflects the actual manner of execution.144
Prior South Carolina law recognized the self-proving option
as of June 28, 1984.145 Before that date, however, South Carolina

144. Another traditional use of the attestation clause is to reduce the possibility of
the witness at probate forgetting about or denying the occurrence of the will execution,
at least as described therein. See O'Neal v. Jennings, 53 Md. App. 604, 455 A.2d 66
(1983); Morris v. Estate of West, 643 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). Presumably, the
self-proving clause could serve a similar purpose, especially since in most cases the use of
the self-proving form obviates the need for a witness at probate. See supra text accompanying note 136-37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-303(c) (1976) allows a court in an informal
probate proceeding to probate without further proof a will which appears to have the
required signatures and an attestation clause which indicates an execution in compliance
with the Code's requirements. Thus, even though the Code does not require an attestation clause for a valid will execution, the use of such a clause may expedite the probate
of the will.
Whether the self-proving form can be amended without affecting its validity is problematic. Although the SCPC does not expressly provide for alternative forms of selfproof (i.e., other than the forms specified in S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976)), § 62-2503 does provide that the self-proving language should be in "substantially" the statutory format.
145. The history of the passage of the previous self-proving section, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-7-615 (Supp. 1986) (recodified at § 62-2-503), is of interest not only because of its
path through the General Assembly but also because of the confusing effect that it may
have had upon some will execution ceremonies in South Carolina. On June 28, 1984,
Governor Richard W. Riley signed an act creating the self-proving provisions of § 21-7615. See 1984 S.C. Acts 2149, No. 508. Although the provisions of that section had originally been a part of the entire SCPC then under consideration, the legislature separated
that section from the rest of the Code and enacted it approximately two years before the
Code's enactment. Since initially intended to be part of the overall Code, the self-proving forms and provisions exemplified by § 21-7-615 differed to some extent from the
previous requirements for proper execution of a will in this state. In particular, these
forms indicated space for only two witnesses to sign the self-proving section (since, unlike prior law, the SCPC requires only two witnesses for proper attestation of a will).
Thus, from June 28, 1984, until the effective date of the remainder of the Code on July 1,
1987, this state had one statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976) (repealed by the
SCPC), requiring three witnesses for a valid will and another statute, id. §, 21-7-615,
apparently requiring only two witnesses for self-proof. This possible disparity caused
some confusion. Some attorneys may have doubted the validity of § 21-7-615; some may
have concluded that § 21-7-615 somehow amended § 21-7-50 so that only two witnesses
would be necessary for valid attestation; and some may have begun using self-proving
wills pursuant to § 21-7-615 but by amending the forms shown therein. See Eubanks,
Comments on Self-Proving Wills, 6 THE EsT. PLANNER, at 5 (1985).
Consequently, the legislature, upon the adoption of the entire Code (including what
then became essentially a recodification of § 21-7-615 as the originally intended S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-503 (1976)), applied the requirement of only two witnesses for a valid
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law generally required the oath of one witness before the court
at common form (uncontested probate) and of all witnesses at
solemn form (contested probate).14
4. Choice of Law
The SCPC provides that a written will is valid if, either at
the time of execution or at the date of the testator's death, the
execution complies with the requirements of section 62-2-502 or,
at the time of execution, the law of the place of execution or the
law of the place of decedent's domicile at execution or at
1 ,7
death.
Prior South Carolina law provided that a written will was
valid if it complied at the date of death with the law in effect in
South Carolina or, if executed elsewhere, with the law in effect
in the place of execution. "8 South Carolina accepted for probate
a will previously probated in another state regardless of the
14 9
manner of execution.

will retroactively to June 28, 1984, validating what might have been otherwise invalid
"two-witness" wills made in reliance on the argument that § 21-7-615 somehow amended
§ 21-7-50 to require only two witnesses. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (1976). Some
further confusion may have arisen with respect to testators dying before July 1, 1987,
who, subsequent to June 28, 1984, executed wills with only two attesting witnesses.
Query: Was the savings provision of § 62-2-502 effective as to testators dying before July
1, 1987 (the general effective date of the Code)? One might have argued that § 5(b) of
Act No. 539, 1986 S.C. Acts 3446 (the SCPC) did not accelerate the effective date of the
savings provision of § 62-2-502. A more beneficial reading, and one probably more consistent with legislative intent, would have rendered the savings clause effective retroactively
to June 28, 1984, even for testators dying prior to July 1, 1987. To clarify this issue, the
General Assembly technically amended the effective date provision of the Code to ensure
that the provision covered this window period. See 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 (S.530).
146, S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC) allowed the judge to
prove the will at common form without notice to interested persons by (1) examining one
or more of the witnesses; (2) in the event the witnesses were dead, outside the state, or
unable to be found, taking proof of the handwriting of the testator and a witness; or (3)
using any other secondary evidence admissable at common law. If an interested person
contested the admission at common form, thereby requiring a solemn form probate, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-7-640 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC) required the court to swear all the
subscribing witnesses as well as take evidence available from other witnesses.
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-505 (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171
(8.530)).
148. In re Elcock, 14 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 39 (1826); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-70 (1976)
(repealed by the SCPC).
149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-910 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
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B. Revocation
1. By Operation of Law
(a) Marriage
The SCPC provides for partial revocation of a will. The
marriage of the testator subsequent to the execution of his will
triggers this partial revocation. 150 If the testator marries after
the execution of his will and fails to provide by will for his
spouse, the Code revokes his will to the extent necessary to provide the omitted spouse with the same share of testator's estate
as if the testator had died intestate. The omitted spouse will not
receive the intestate share equivalent if the will indicates that
the omission was intentional or if the testator provided for the
spouse by nontestamentary transfer and indicated an intent that
such transfer was in lieu of a testamentary transfer. 1 '
Prior South Carolina law provided that marriage by the testator subsequent to the execution of his will entirely revoked his
will if he died survived by his widow or issue of the marriage,
unless the testator expressed on the face of the will that it was
made in contemplation of marriage and 1 52he made provision
therein for his future spouse and children.
(b) Divorce
The SCPC provides that, unless a will expressly indicates
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301 (1976).
151. Id. Query whether the testator can overcome the operation of S.C. CODE ANN. §
62-2-301 (1976) by making a nominal provision for the spouse, since the section applies
"[i]f the testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse. . . ... Id. If a nominal
provision were effective to avoid the operation of the statute, then the most that a
spouse could demand presumably would be one-third of the testator's estate pursuant to
the elective share. Because the omitted spouse share is equivalent to the intestate share,
the least that a spouse could take under § 62-2-301 would be one-half of the estate. See
infra text accompanying notes 225-32.
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-220 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). Although the statute
refers to male testators, the courts have applied its provisions to female testators. See
Atkins v. Atkins, 287 S.C. 584, 340 S.E.2d 537 (1986); In re Roton, 95 S.C. 118, 78 S.E.
711 (1913). In order to revoke, the subsequent marriage must be lawful. Campbell v.
Christian, 235 S.C. 102, 110 S.E.2d 1 (1959). At least one respected commentator has
suggested that provision for the future spouse and issue could be nominal, since the
statute specifies no minimum share. See C. KARESH, supra note 84, at 49.
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otherwise, the termination of a marriage subsequent to the execution of the testator's will partially revokes the will to the extent of devises to the ex-spouse or appointments of the exspouse to an office.' 53 For these purposes the Code treats the
spouse as having predeceased the testator. Any invalidated devise passes to other devisees or by partial intestacy, depending
on the terms of the will.
Prior South Carolina law provided similarly, but was silent
as to the treatment of the ex-spouse as predeceased." 4
(c)

Pretermitted Children

Under the SCPC, a testator who fails to provide in his will
for a child born or adopted after the execution thereof will have
his will revoked to the extent necessary to provide the omitted
child with the same share of testator's estate as if he had died
intestate. 5 5 The omitted child will not receive the intestate
share equivalent if the will indicates that (1) the omission was
intentional, (2) the testator provided for that child by nontestamentary transfer and indicated an intent that such transfer was
in lieu of a testamentary transfer, or (3) at the time of execution
the testator had at least one other child and left at least fifty
percent of his estate to the other parent of the omitted child.156
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-507 (1976). The termination of a marriage includes divorce, annulment, or the participation by the testator's spouse in ". . .a valid proceeding
concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property rights or confirming
equitable distribution between the spouses ....

."

Section 62-2-507 specifically incorpo-

rates the following provisions of S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-802(b) and (c) (1976), which do
not include as a surviving spouse: (1) A spouse who obtains or consents to a decree of
divorce or annulment, even if not recognized in South Carolina (unless the couple subsequently lives together as husband and wife) and (2) a spouse who participates in a marriage ceremony (regardless of its validity) with a third party after the testator obtained a
decree of divorce or annulment. The Code defines the noun "devise" as "a testamentary
disposition of real or personal property, including both devise and bequest as formerly
used." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(7) (1976).
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-230 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). For an example of
problems which can result when a statute which partially revokes a will because of divorce is silent as to the treatment of the ex-spouse as predeceased, see Estate of Graef v.
McQuillen, 124 Wis. 2d 25, 368 N.W.2d 633 (1985).
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-302 (1976).
156. Id. The Code recognizes that the testator may prefer to leave the estate to the
surviving parent of the child rather than to the child, or to the child but by some means
other than by will. The Code also allows intentional disinheritance of a child born after
the execution of the will if the will so indicates. Under prior South Carolina law, depend-
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In any event, a child who is not included in testator's will, because at the time of execution thereof the testator mistakenly
believes the child to be dead, will receive an intestate share. 157 A

statute of limitations applies. The child or his conservator must
testator's
claim his share by the later of eight months after
15 s
death or six months after the probate of the will.

Prior South Carolina law gave a child born after the execution of his parent's will a share equal to those children provided
for in the will, unless the will made provision for such afterborn
children.159 Thus, the determination of the omitted child's share
resulted not from a comparison with the intestate share but
rather from a pro rata contribution by those children who did
1

take.

60

2. By Act
The SCPC allows the partial or complete revocation of a
will by a subsequent will, which expressly or by implication (inconsistency) revokes, or by the physical act of burning, tearing,
canceling, obliterating, or destroying the testamentary instrument, if accompanied by the intent to revoke.1 '

ing on the circumstances, a testator could either disinherit an afterborn child without the
will so indicating, or not disinherit an afterborn child despite an attempt in the will to do
SO.
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-302(c) (1976).
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-302(d) (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No.
171 (S.530)). The child or conservator properly makes the claim by the filing thereof in
court and the mailing or delivering thereof to the personal representative.
159. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-7-450, -460 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
160. See, e.g., Talbird v. Verdier, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 592 (1797). The share of the
afterborn child would be subject to the same limitations and conditions as the devises
and bequests to those children named in the will. Ex parte Warren, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 44
(1840).
Thus, under prior law, the testator could disinherit an afterborn child without expressing his intent, if the will left no gift to other children. If the will left gifts to other
children, the testator could not disinherit the afterborn child. The child would share
with his sibling devisees and legatees, unless the will made provision for him. Query
whether a nominal provision would suffice.
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-506 (1976). If revocation is by physical act, the testator,
or his proxy in his presence and at his direction, must commit the act.
The prior South Carolina case law should continue to serve to construe the statutory
requirements for effective revocation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976), which provides that, unless displaced by the provisions of the Code, the principles of law and
equity supplement the Code.
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Prior South Carolina law provided similarly."6 2
C. Revival
If a subsequent will that revoked a prior will is itself revoked by physical act, the SCPC does not revive the prior will
unless the intent of the testator to revive is proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.16 3 If a subsequent will which revoked a prior will is itself revoked by a third will, the Code does
not revive the prior (first) will except to the extent indicated by
the third will.16
Example 12
Testator (T) executes Will #1 on June 1, 1988. On June 1,
1989, T executes Will #2, which expressly revokes Will #1. On
June 1, 1990, T destroys Will #2 with the intent to revoke that
will. Will #1 is not revived unless proof of T's intent to revive is
clear, cogent, and convincing.
Example 13
Testator (T) executes Will #1 on June 1, 1988. On June 1,
1989, T executes Will #2, which expressly revokes Will #1. On
June 1, 1990, T executes Will #3, which expressly revokes Will
#2. Will #1 is revived only to the extent indicated by Will #3.
If a subsequent will which revoked a prior will was itself
revoked, prior South Carolina law provided that the prior will
was revived unless the testator intended otherwise. 6 5

162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-210 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). Although that section listed only destroying and obliterating as permissible physical acts of revocation,
cases have included burning, cancelling, and tearing as being within the definition of
"destroying." See, e.g., Johnson v. Brailsford, 10 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 272 (1820).
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-508 (1976).
164. Id. The difference in the required evidence necessary for revival depending on
whether the revoking will is itself revoked by physical act or by subsequent will relates to
the traditional reluctance of courts to consider extrinsic evidence when interpreting wills,
yet recognizing the need to use extrinsic evidence in all revocations by physical act to
determine that the requisite intent accompanied the act. See In re Estate of Barker, 448
So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
165. See Kollock v. Williams, 131 S.C. 352, 127 S.E. 444 (1925); Taylor v. Taylor, 10
S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 482 (1820). Actually, the use of the term revival is not corn-
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D. Incorporation by Reference

The SCPC allows a written document to be incorporated by
reference if the document exists when the will is executed, the
will indicates the intent to incorporate, and the will sufficiently
identifies the document to be incorporated."6
Prior South Carolina law allowed a written document to be
incorporated by reference according to the same requirements
imposed by the SCPC, 16 7 although perhaps with the additional
requirement that the will refer to the document as being in
168
existence.

E. Events of Independent Significance
The SCPC codifies the common-law doctrine allowing the
will to refer to events of independent significance to affect the
will's dispositions. The events must have other than purely testamentary significance, that is, some lifetime motive or purpose. 16 9 Wills may refer properly to qualifying events which occur even after the execution of the will. 17 0 The execution or

pletely accurate when used under prior law. Since a will is effective only upon the death
of the testator, South Carolina treated the first will as merely being covered, rather than
revoked, by the second will, until the testator died. Thus, upon revocation of the second
will, the first will was uncovered.
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-509 (1976). If a document attempting to effect a transfer
at death is neither part of the will nor is incorporated therein by reference, then that
document will have effect only if executed in compliance with the requisite formalities
for testamentary documents. See, e.g., Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Beach, 145 Il.
App. 3d 682, 495 N.E.2d 1173 (1986).
167. See, e.g., Richardson v. Byrd, 166 S.C. 251, 164 S.E. 643 (1932).
168. Certain well-respected commentators cite this requirement. See, e.g., C.
KARESH, supra note 84, at 36; T. ATKINSON, supra note 77 at 388-89. The South Carolina
cases discussing incorporation by reference did not appear to require specifically that the
will refer to the document to be incorporated as being in existence. See South Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Copeland, 248 S.C. 203, 149 S.E.2d 615 (1966); Richardson v. Byrd, 166
S.C. 251, 164 S.E. 643 (1932); Johnson v. Clarkson, 24 S.C. Eq. (3 Rich. Eq.) 305 (1851);
Milledge v. Lanor, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) 617 (1817). A requirement that the will refer to
the document to be incorporated as being in existence seems repetitious of the requirements that the document be in existence and properly identified.
169. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-511 (1976). Events of independent significance are also
known as facts, or acts, of independent significance. An attempt to affect dispositions
effective at death must comply with the formality requirements for execution of a testamentary document. Rendering the attempt nontestamentary obviates the necessity for
compliance therewith.
170. Id. These after-occurring events could not be incorporated by reference, since
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revocation of the will of one other than the testator may
1 71
qualify.
Example 14
The will of Testator (T) provides that B shall inherit "the
car that I own at my death." At the time of execution, T owns a
ten-year-old Chevrolet. Subsequently, T purchases a new Mercedes. If T dies owning the Mercedes, B should take. The act of
purchasing the Mercedes most probably had lifetime significance
(i.e., T wanted to drive a Mercedes) and was not purely
testamentary.
Example 15
The will of Testator (T) devises Blackacre to "the beneficiaries I name on a list I will hereinafter prepare." After the execution of the will, T prepares a list naming BI and B2 as beneficiaries. The list is unwitnessed and unsigned. The act probably
has no lifetime significance independent from purely testamentary purposes. Because the "execution" of the list did not comply with the requirements for executing a valid will, 172 the list
cannot operate to affect the disposition of Blackacre at T's
73
death.
Prior South Carolina law recognized the common-law doctrine of acts of independent significance. 74
F.

Separate Writing Identifying Personal Property Bequest
The SCPC allows the will to refer to a written list or state-

that doctrine requires existence at the time of execution.
171. Id.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
173. Nor is incorporation by reference applicable to save the devise: the list was not
in existence at the time of execution of the will. See supra text accompanying note 166.
174. See, e.g., South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Copeland, 248 S.C. 203, 149 S.E.2d 615
(1966). Although the court in Copeland recognized the doctrine, the doctrine was inapplicable because the testator's will attempted to incorporate by reference the will of another, even if not yet executed. Note that the SCPC specifically allows reference to the
will of another as an event of independent significance, thereby perhaps overruling and
at least clarifying the ruling in Copeland. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
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ment to dispose of certain tangible personal property, regardless
of when the list is prepared or amended and even if the list is
not executed in compliance with the requisite will formalities. 17 5
Without this specific statutory authorization, the list may not
qualify as an act of independent significance since it lacked lifetime significance, 176 nor could it be incorporated by reference if
not in existence at the time of execution of the will. 177 Section
62-2-51217 admits the list into evidence, if signed by the testator
or if in his handwriting, to the extent the list concerns qualifying
property.
Prior South Carolina law did not authorize specifically a reference to a list. Estate planners who have nevertheless included
such an attempt in certain estate plans 17 should be aware that
the attempt may have been deemed an invalid testamentary
transfer, since the list would not have been prepared in compliance with the requisite formalities for will execution and might
not have been saved by the doctrines of incorporation by reference or acts of independent significance.
G.
1.

Construction

Rules of Construction

The SCPC provides that any rules of construction expressed
in the Code apply unless the testator's will indicates a contrary
intent. 1 0 Prior South Carolina law provided similarly: rules of
construction apply secondarily to testator's intent.' 8 '

175. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-512 (1976).
176. See supra text acccompanying notes 169-74.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
178. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-512 (1976). The Code treats tangible personal property,
except for money, evidences of debt, title documents, securities, and property used in a
trade or business, as qualifying property.
179. See R. WILKINS, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS: A SysTmis APPROACH 317-18 (rev. ed. 1985).
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-601 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 70 S.E.2d 637 (1952). In Rogers the
supreme court held that the goal of will interpretation is to determine the intent of the
testator. Only if the intent is not ascertainable from the will should the court impose
rules of construction on the interpretation process.
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2. Treatment of Half Bloods, Illegitimates, and Adopteds
For testacy purposes the SCPC treats half-bloods, adopteds,
and illegitimates the same as for intestacy purposes with one exception: The Code does not consider an illegitimate child to be
the child of the father unless the father "openly and notoriously" treated the child as his own. is2
Prior South Carolina law did not prefer the whole blood to
the half blood in any testacy situation.18 3 The law considered

adopted children as included within the term "children" for purposes of the wills of adoptive parents, but not for purposes of
the wills of testators other than the adoptive parents.184 The law
was unclear as to whether illegitimates were included within certain terms of relationship for testacy proposes.18
182. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-609 (1976). The exception with respect to the treatment
of the illegitimate child may affect the rights under S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-302 (1976) of a
child born after the execution of the father's will. See supra text accompanying notes
155-58.
Treatment for testacy purposes of half bloods as they are treated for intestacy purposes creates a preference for the whole blood over the half blood at the sibling level of
relationship to the testator. See supra text accompanying notes 61-74.
183. Greer v. Greer, 138 S.C. 475, 136 S.E. 742 (1925); Gist v. Gist, 111 S.C. 184, 97
S.E. 240 (1918); Lewis v. Executors of Vereen, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 246 (1803). Note that
the treatment of whole blood and half blood differed for intestacy purposes: the statute
of descent and distribution preferred whole-blood brothers and sisters over half-blood
brothers and sisters of the intestate. By dovetailing the treatment of half bloods for testacy and inte3tacy purposes, the SCPC thereby introduces a discrimination at the sibling
level for testate estates which did not exist under prior law. See supra text accompanying notes 61-74.
184. See, e.g., Bagwell v. Alexander, 285 S.C. 331, 329 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1935)
(recognizing this State's adherence to the so-called stranger to the adoption rule); see
also Turner v. Turner, 260 S.C. 439, 196 S.E.2d 498 (1973). By treating adopteds similarly for testate and intestate estates, the SCPC effectively reverses the stranger to the
adoption rule.
185. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.C. 213, 76 S.E. 468 (1912); Shearman v. Angel, 8 S.C. Eq.
(Bail. Eq.) 351 (1831); Wish v. Kershaw, 7 S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 353 (1827).
Prior law expressly attempted to limit the amount of an estate a testator could leave
to illegitimate children. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-7-480, 27-23-100 (1976), notorious as the
Bastardy Statutes, operated to limit inter vivos and testamentary gifts to a paramour
and illegitimate children to one-fourth of the estate after debts. In the case of In re
Estate of Mercer, 288 S.C. 313, 342 S.E.2d 591 (1986), the South Carolina Supreme
Court determined that § 21-7-480 applied to male testators only and therefore violated
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The court did not, however, address expressly § 27-23-100, which provisions are substantially analogous to § 217-480, except perhaps more broadly applicable with respect to the types of transfers limited. Apparently, § 27-23-100 could limit both inter vivos and testamentary transfers.
The SCPC repeals both Bastardy Statutes, see South Carolina Probate Code, 1986 Acts
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3. Anti-Lapse
The SCPC provides that if a beneficiary who is the testator's great-grandparent or lineal descendent thereof predeceases
the testator, the gift to that beneficiary will not lapse, but will

instead pass to the issue of that predeceased beneficiary."8 6 The

Code also specifically includes within the protection of the statute a predeceased member of a class who receives a class gift,
regardless of that class member's date of death.18 7 The prior
South Carolina anti-lapse statute saved gifts only when the predeceased beneficiary was a child of the testator who left surviving issue.""8 The statute did not address specifically whether its
provisions applied to predeceased class members. 9
4. Lapsed Devises
Upon the lapse of a devise under the SCPC, the subject
property of a lapsed preresiduary devise passes to the residuary
beneficiaries, of a partially lapsed residuary devise to the remaining residuary beneficiaries, and of a completely lapsed residuary devise to the testator's intestate heirs.' 9 °

3446, No. 539, § 2.
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603 (1976). The contrary intent of the testator can supersede the operation of this section. For example, if Testator leaves Blackacre to his
son, C1, but to his neighbor, N, if C1 predeceases Testator, the will expresses a substitutional preference. The anti-lapse statute does not apply.
187. Id. Obviously, for the statute to save the gift, the class member must be within
the protected degree of relationship, i.e., testator's great-grandparent or lineal descendent thereof. When anti-lapse statutes do not deal specifically with the treatment afforded to predeceased class members, confusion may result. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL,
PREFACE TO ESTATES INLAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 140-41 (2d ed. 1984). The anti-lapse
statute does not apply to trust beneficiaries. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603 (1976) applies to
gifts to devisees; in the case of a devise to a trust or trustee, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(8)
(1976) defines a devisee as the trust or trustee, not the beneficiary.
188. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§

21-7-470 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).

189. Id.
190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-604 (1976) expressly covers the lapsed preresiduary and
partially lapsed residuary situations. The common law would cover the completely lapsed
residuary situation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976), which provides that, unless
displaced by the provisions of the Code, the principles of law and equity supplement the
Code.
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Example 16
Testator (T) leaves Blackacre to his friend, F, and the residue of his estate to his grandsons GC1, and GC2, in equal
shares. If F predeceases T, that devise lapses and falls into the
residuary. If GC1 also predeceases T, GC2 takes the entire
residuary.
Prior South Carolina law provided similarly with respect to
As to partially lapsed residuary
lapsed preresiduary gifts.'
rule." The
gifts, this state followed the "no-residue-of-a-residue
1 92
lapsed gift passed by partial intestacy.
Example 17
Testator (T) left Blackacre to his friend, F, and the residue
of his estate to his grandsons, GC1 and GC2, in equal shares. If
F predeceased T, that devise lapsed and fell into the residuary.
T, that share passed to the heirs of T by
If GC1 predeceased
93
partial intestacy.1
5. Satisfaction (Ademption by Satisfaction)
Under the SCPC, a lifetime gift to a donee who is also a
beneficiary under the donor's will is not chargeable as a satisfaction against the donee's devise under the donor's will unless indicated otherwise by the will, by a writing executed by the donor
with the gift, or by a written
contemporaneously
94
acknowledgement.
Under prior South Carolina law, the testator's intent deter191. Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956); Davis v. Davis, 208 S.C.
182, 37 S.E.2d 530 (1946); Cureton v. Massey, 34 S.C. Eq. (13 Rich. Eq.) 104 (1866).
192. Padgett v. Black, 229 S.C. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956). The rule applied unless
the testator intended a joint tenancy with survivorship or a class gift. See Davis v. Davis,
208 S.C. 182, 37 S.E.2d 530 (1946); Cureton v. Massey, 34 S.C. Eq. (13 Rich. Eq.) 104

(1866).
193. Assuming that T did not intend the residuary gift "in equal shares" to create a
joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and assuming T did not intend a class gift.
194. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-610 (1976). For purposes of determining the reduction to
be made from the donee's devise under the will, a gift treated as a satisfaction is valued
as of the date the donee took possession or enjoyment, or the date of the testator's death,
whichever is sooner.
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mined whether a lifetime gift to his beneficiary was offset as a
satisfaction against the beneficiary's ultimate share under the
will."' 5 The previous law did not require a writing expressing the
testator's intent. 1 96 Certain rebuttable presumptions, however,
aided in the interpretation of intent. The testator presumably
intended the gift as a satisfaction if the donee was his child. A
gift to a donee other than a child triggered the reverse
presumption. 9 '
6. Nonademption
The SCPC provides that if specifically devised property is
not owned by the testator at his death, then the devisee of that
property is entitled to whatever remains of that property. 9 ' The
specific devisee also takes any unpaid purchase price for that
property (plus any security interest therefor), any unpaid condemnation award for that property, and any unpaid insurance
proceeds resulting from a casualty to that property owed to the
decedent at his death. The devisee also takes any property
owned at death by the decedent that was acquired through a
foreclosure, or the security for a specifically devised obligation in
lieu of foreclosure.'9 9
Special rules apply in certain situations where the conservator of a testator sells the specifically devised property, or receives condemnation or insurance proceeds with respect to that
property. The devisee is entitled to a general pecuniary devise
equal to the sales price, condemnation award, or insurance proceeds reduced to the extent he has received other value for that
property pursuant to the Code's nonademption provisions. The
subsequent cessation of the testator's disability and his survival
for at least one year thereafter render the special rules inapplicable. 00° Other special rules apply if the testator specifically de195. Allen v. Allen, 13 S.C. 512 (1880).
196. Id. at 525-26.
197. Id. The latter presumption did not apply if its application would lead to the
preference of a stranger (one not a child) to a child of the testator.
198. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-606 (1976).
199. Id.
200. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(6) (1976) defines conservator as a person appointed
by a court to manage the estate of a protected person. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101 (1976),
somewhat circuitously, defines a protected person as a minor or incompetent person for
whom a conservator has been appointed or a protective order made.
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vises securities. The devisee of that property is entitled to
whatever remains of the securities plus any additional securities
resulting from some action initiated by the entity in which the
security indicates an ownership interest, a merger, a consolidation, a reorganization, or a dividend reinvestment plan of a regulated investment company. 0 1
Prior South Carolina law differed in that the proceeds and
products of a specific bequest disposed of prior to the testator's
death did not pass to the specific devisee.2 °2
7. Nonexoneration
The SCPC provides that a specific devise passes subject to
any security interest with no right of the specific devisee thereof
to exoneration, unless the will indicates a contrary intention.20 3
Prior South Carolina law may have provided, absent an indication of the testator's intent otherwise, for exoneration of devises
subject to security interests.2 4

201. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-605 (1976).

202. See Taylor v. Goddard, 265 S.C. 327, 218 S.E.2d 246 (1975); see also Stanton v.
David, 193 S.C. 108, 7 S.E.2d 852 (1940). For a recent, brief discussion of ademption by
extinction, see Fenzel v. Floyd, 289 S.C. 495, 347 S.E.2d 105 (1986). Nor did any South
Carolina decision grant the specific devisee a substitutional general pecuniary bequest in
the event specifically devised property was sold, condemned, or damaged while a guardian handled the testator's estate. At common law, whether the estate contained property
which was the subject of a specific devise sometimes depended on the type of change
effected on the property during the testator's lifetime. If the change were merely formal,
the devisee would take the property in its new form; if the change were substantial, then
the devisee did not take. See Means, supra note 107, at 491, 537.
203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-607 (1976). Exoneration allows the specific devisee of
property subject to a lien to require the payment of the underlying debt from estate
assets other than the specifically devised property. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 77, at
706-08, 764-66.
204. Pertinent cases decided under South Carolina law arguably provided for the
right of exoneration. These cases may have turned, however, not on the general application of the doctrine of exoneration, but rather on either the particular order of abatement in South Carolina, generally protecting real estate over personal property for the
payment of debts (except that specific legacies were more protected than intestate realty), or on the testator's expressed intent. The results apparently would have been the
same regardless of which theory the court used. See C. KARESH, WILLS (1977); A. MOSES,
SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATE

PRACTICE MANUAL

13-17 (2d ed. 1983); see also Ex parte

Clark, 130 S.C. 501, 126 S.E. 137 (1925); Henagen v. Harllee, 28 S.C. Eq. (10 Rich. Eq.)
285 (1858); Watson v. Child, 26 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.) 129 (1856); Lawton v. Hunt, 25
S.C. Eq. (4 Rich. Eq.) 233 (1852); Brown v. James, 22 S.C. Eq. (3 Strob. Eq.) 24 (1849);
Ford v. Gaithur, 19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 270 (1846). Note that the SCPC provision for
nonexoneration applies specifically to testate estates and does not affect prior South Car-
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8. Exercise of Powers of Appointment
Under the SCPC, a donee of a power of appointment can
exercise the power by his will only if the will makes specific reference to the power or otherwise indicates the donor's intent.0 5
Under prior South Carolina law, a donee could exercise a power
of appointment by indicating his intent,20 6 or, without evidencing his intent to exercise, by making a general devise of property
(unless he indicated a contrary intent).2 0
H.

Contracts Relating to Wills

The SCPC allows proof of a contract to make a will, not to
make a will, or to revoke a will only if the will states the material provisions of the contract, if the will expressly refers to the
contract and extrinsic proof of the terms of the contract exists,
or if the decedent signs a writing that evidences the contract and
extrinsic proof of the terms of the contract exists.20° The Code's
provisions apply only to contracts made after July 1, 1987. The
provisions affect only matters of proof. Prior South Carolina law
remains determinative of the efficacy of the contracts.20 9
Prior South Carolina law recognized the ability of a decedent to contract with respect to the disposition of his estate.
The cases required the contract to "be established by the most
satisfactory proof and after the strictest and most thorough examination of all circumstances."' 21 0

olina law with respect to intestate estates. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103 (1976), which
provides that unless displaced by the provisions of the Code, the principles of law and
equity supplement the Code. See also Ford v. Gaithur, 19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 270
(1846).
205. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-608 (1976).
206. Boyd v. Satterwhite, 10 S.C. 45 (1877).
207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-430 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). This section definitely applied with respect to a general power, but its application to a special power was
uncertain. See Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 70 S.E.2d 637 (1952).
208. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-701 (1976).
209. Id.
210. McKeegan v. O'Neill, 22 S.C. 454, 467 (1885); see also Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C.
497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963); Looper v. Whitaker, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266 (1957); Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905); Rivers v. Executors of Rivers, 5 S.C.L. (3
Des.) 190 (1811); Gary v. Executors of James, 5 S.C.L. (4 Des.) 185 (1811); Grimke v.
Executors of Grimke, 2 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 366 (1794); Izard v. Middleton, 1 S.C. Eq. (1
Des.) 116 (1785).
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L Limitation of Devises
1. Disclaimer
The SCPC allows any person, or one with authority to act
on his behalf, to disclaim any interest in property transferred by
any means whatsoever to the disclaimant.211 Upon an effective
disclaimer, the disclaimed property is considered to have never
been transferred to the disclaimant 12 The disclaimer relates
back to the date when the transfer (by the transferor) of the
interest became effective; for purposes of the disclaimed property interest, the disclaimant is deemed to have predeceased
that date. For a future interest that takes possession or enjoyment after the disclaimed interest terminates, the disclaimant is
deemed to have died before the disclaimant's interest in the disclaimed property vested indefeasibly and before the disclaimant
was finally ascertained. An exception to the general rule that a
disclaimant is treated as predeceased for all purposes applies if
the disclaimant is a spouse of the transferor. Even though the
spouse is deemed to have predeceased the effective date of the
transfer for disclaimer purposes, the spouse is not deemed predeceased for other subsequent methods by which the property
may be transferred to the spouse.213
Example 18
Testator (T) leaves his entire estate to her husband (H). T's
will does not name a contingent beneficiary. T and H have no
issue. H disclaims the devise. For purposes of that disclaimer,
the Code considers H predeceased, and the disclaimed property
will now pass by intestacy. For purposes of the determination of
T's intestate heirs, the Code does not consider H as having pre211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-801 (1976).
212. Id. § 62-2-801(a).
213. Id. § 62-2-801(d). The transferor can overcome the operation of § 62-2-801(d)
by providing otherwise. Section 62-2-801(e) defines the date of the effectiveness of the
transfer for disclaimer purposes as generally the date when the transfer itself becomes
effective. Whether the disclaimer provisions of the SCPC can affect other than tax issues
becomes problematic in light of a recent court of appeals ruling. See Pate v. Ford, No.
0935 (S.C. App. Apr. 13, 1987), modified, - S.C. -, 360 S.E.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, No. 0935 (S.C. Sept. 21, 1987).
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deceased T. H takes by intestacy.
The SCPC recognizes the right to disclaim despite any
214
spendthrift or similar restriction imposed by the transferror.
215
The disclaimant can effectively waive the right to disclaim.
The operation of the representation rules of SCPC section
62-2-106216 in conjunction with the disclaimer provisions of section 62-2-801217 can create a trap for the unwary or an opportunity for the wary.
Example 19
Intestate (I) dies survived by one child (Cl), three
grandchildren (GC1, GC2, and GC3) by C1, and one grandchild
(GC4) by his predeceased child C2. Under the SCPC rules of
intestate distribution, GC4 and C1 each would take one-half of
I's estate.

I

[!
Cl
1/2

GC1

GC2

C2

GC3

GC4

1/2

214.
215.
216.
217.

S.C. CODE ANN. §
Id. § 62-2-801(c).
S.C. CODE ANN. §
S.C. CODE ANN. §

62-2-801(b) (1976).
To be effective, the waiver must be written.
62-2-106 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
62-2-801 (1976).
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If, however, C1 disclaims, section 62-2-801 treats him as having
predeceased I. In that event, GC1, GC2, GC3, and GC4 each
take one-fourth of the estate, thereby allowing Cl's "side" to
take three-fourths of the total.
I

I

F

7

C1 (disclaims)

GC2
1/4

GC1
1/4

GC3
1/4

C2

GC4
1/4

Prior South Carolina law provided similarly in many respects, but differed in several significant areas.2 18 Prior law expressly precluded the operation of the anti-lapse statute with respect to disclaimed property interests. 2 19 Previous section 21-3750 allowed the disclaimers of one or more transfers out of several
successive transfers. 220 Finally, prior law treated disclaimers as
binding not only upon the disclaimant but also upon those
claiming under or through the disclaimant.2 2 1
2. Killer/Beneficiary
The SCPC prohibits inheritance from a decedent by one
who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent. Section 622-803222 treats the killer as predeceased not only for purposes of

218.

See generally S.C.

CODE ANN.

§§ 21-37-10 to -80 (1976) (repealed by the

SCPC).
219. Id. § 21-37-50(a) (repealed by the SCPC).
220. Id. § 21-37-50(c) (repealed by the SCPC); see id. § 21-37-40(a)(5) (repealed by

the SCPC).
221. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 21-37-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC).

222. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (1976). The Code severs joint tenancies shared by
the killer and the victim. The provisions of § 62-2-803 protect a bona fide purchaser for
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testate and intestate property, but also for contracts payable on
the death of the victim (including insurance contracts), joint
tenancies, and for any other property that would have otherwise
passed to the killer upon the death of the victim.
A conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive to trigger the operation of section 62-2-803. Any other outcome of a criminal charge or trial is inapplicable to this section.
In those cases, the court deciding whether to apply the provisions of this section must determine by the preponderance of the
evidence that a felonious and intentional killing occurred.2 2 3
224
Prior South Carolina law provided similarly.
J. Family Protection:Limitation of Testamentary Power
1. Elective Share
The SCPC introduces the concept of the elective share, or
forced share, of the surviving spouse against the decedent
spouse's probate estate.225 The surviving spouse of a domiciliary
decedent may opt to take an elective share of one-third of the
decedent's probate estate.2 2 6 The spouse may apply the elective
share after reduction of the probate estate for proper claims and
funeral and administrative expenses.227
The surviving spouse, his attorney in fact, or the court protecting him may exercise the right of election, but in no event
later than the death of the surviving spouse.228 The spouse can

value from the killer. In addition, any insurance company or bank paying proceeds without written notice will not be liable. See LeBlanc, supra note 2, at 511, 523-24.
223. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803(e) (1976).
224. Both by case law and by statute, South Carolina prohibited one who unlawfully
killed another from benefitting from his act. See S.C. Code Ann. § 21-1-50 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC); see also Leggette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403, 85 S.E.2d 576 (1955).
225. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -207 (1976). For purposes of the
Code's elective share provisions, "probate estate" means the decedent's property passing
under the decedent's will plus the decedent's property passing by intestacy. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-202 (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -,
No. 171 (S.530)).
226. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -,
No. 171
(S.530)). The right to an elective share of a non-domiciliary is determined by the laws of
the state of domicile at the time of death. Whether one qualifies as a surviving spouse is
determined under S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-802 (1976).
227. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -,
No. 171

(S.530)).
228. Id. § 62-2-203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(3) (1976) defines "protected person"
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waive the right to elect, either before or after marriage, and in
whole or in part, by a signed writing executed after a fair disclosure.22 The spouse must provide notice of the election by filing
in the court and by mailing or delivering to the personal representative of the decedent's estate, by the later of eight months
after the decedent's death or six months after probate of the de2 30
cedent's will.

The Code satisfies the elective share in two ways: First, by
property of the decedent's probate estate that passes to the
spouse (both testate and intestate) and second, by remaining
property of the decedent's probate estate.2 3 ' The surviving

spouse may retain any property received outside the decedent's
will, except by intestacy, without reducing the elective share. 3 2
Prior South Carolina law did not recognize the concept of
the elective share, but the former rights of the surviving spouse
to dower and to curtesy, in order to prevent total disinheritance
of a spouse, were similar in spirit to the elective share.2 3

as a minor or incapacitated person for whom a conservator has been appointed or protective order made.
229. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (1976). The spouse may also waive the homestead
allowance and exempt property set-aside. See infra text accompanying notes 234-43.
230. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-205 (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171
(S.530)). This section also requires the spouse to notify the personal representative and
persons who were to receive from the estate (if their interests will be adversely affected)
of the time and place for the hearing. The spouse can withdraw an election prior to final
determination by the court.
231. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171
(S.530)). The Code reduces the elective share by testate and intestate property that
would have passed to the surviving spouse but which was disclaimed.
The Code values a beneficial interest left to a surviving spouse at the full value of
the property subject to the beneficial interest provided that interest qualifies for the
South Carolina estate tax marital deduction. Included is qualified terminable interest
property, regardless of whether an election is made to treat it as such. See I.R.C. §
2056(b)(7)(B)(v); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-60 (1976) (as effective January 1, 1986). The
SCPC does not addrC-,s, however, the valuation of a beneficial interest left to a spouse
which would not qualify for the marital deduction.
If necessary to charge remaining property to satisfy the elective share, the Code
selects such property in accordance with the SCPC order of abatement. See S.C CODE
ANN. § 62-3-902 (1976).
232. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-206 (1976).
233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-10 (1976) (repealed by the SCPC). The rights to dower
and curtesy, however, were inapplicable under the most current South Carolina law. See
Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-10 (1976)
(repealed by the SCPC).
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2. Exempt Property
The SCPC entitles a domiciliary

decedent's

surviving

spouse (or if none, then the decedent's minor or dependent children) to certain personal property of the estate not to exceed a
value of five thousand dollars.23 4 Qualifying property includes
household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and

personal effects. To the extent that the decedent's equity in
qualifying property falls short of five thousand dollars, the

spouse or children may claim other property of the estate. 35
The exempt property passes free from the claims of most
creditors2 36 and also from the claims of decedent's benefi-

ciaries.23 7 The spouse, or children, must reduce the entitlement

to exempt property by any amounts received under the dece-

dent's will or through intestacy.23 Apparently, the decedent
cannot overcome the exempt property entitlement by indicating
an intent to the contrary; the set aside seems to be mandatory.
The right to the exempt property entitlement exists in addition
to any homestead and personal property exemptions otherwise
2 39
granted by law.

To qualify for the entitlement, a claimant must survive the

decedent for at least 120 hours.240 The claimant must file his
claim to the entitlement with the court and also mail or deliver

234. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 62-2-401 (1976).

235. Id. The decedent's equity in assets is the value of the assets less the debts
secured by security interests therein.
236. The exempt property is not free from administrative and funeral expenses. Id.;
see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-805(a)(1) (1976).
237. The concept of exempt property passing free from the claims of decedent's
beneficiaries is novel to South Carolina law. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-402 (1976) protects
specific devises to the extent other estate assets exist to satisfy the exempt property
entitlement, but does not address otherwise the order by which other beneficiaries may
have to relinquish their devises in order to satisfy the exempt property entitlement. Presumably, the order of abatement set forth in S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-902 (1976) would
control.
238. The decedent can overcome this offset requirement by providing otherwise in a
will, i.e., that the exempt property entitlement shall be in addition to any other property
received from the estate by the spouse or children. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-401 (1976).
239. Id. Prior law granted limited protection from the claims of decedent's creditors
(but not other beneficiaries) for real property and perhaps certain personal property.
The SCPC did not revoke or supersede the statutory provisions allowing these exemptions. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43.
240. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-104 (1976). For another 120-hour survivorship requirement under the Code, see supra subpart II.B.
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it to the personal representative of the decedent's estate by the
later of eight months after decedent's death or six months after
probate of the decedent's will.241
Prior South Carolina law did not provide for an entitlement
free from the claims of decedent's beneficiaries but did recognize
the protection of certain property from the claims of decedent's
creditors. 2 42 The statutory homestead allowance protected the
decedent's real estate to the extent of one thousand dollars in
value from the claims of creditors; the personal property allowance apparently protected five hundred dollars worth.243
IV.

WILL SUBSTITUTES: NONPROBATE TRANSFERS

The SCPC codifies significant areas of law dealing with nonprobate transfers. Nonprobate, or nontestamentary, transfers
are transfers intended to pass possession or enjoyment at the
transferor's death, but which pass independently of the will, if
any, of the decedent, and outside the decedent's estate. 244 Prior
241. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-402(b) (1976) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -,
No.
171 (S.530)).
242. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-41-100, -200, - 310 (1976). The SCPC exempt property entitlement exists in addition to these exemption rights, which were not
repealed by the Code.
243. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-100 (1976) grants a homestead allowance in the amount
of $1,000 protecting the homestead real property of the "head of the household" from
the claims of creditors during his lifetime. The exemption continues with respect to the
estate of the decedent. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-310 (1976) grants an exemption from the
claims of creditors to personal property in the amount of $500. Apparently, the personal
property exemption also applies to the decedent's estate. In 1981 the South Carolina
Exemption Reform Act, 1981 S.C. Acts 78, No. 53, added § 15-41-200, which significantly
increases the lifetime protection of a property owner from the claims of creditors, both
with respect to amount and to types of property protected. That section supersedes §§
15-41-100 and -310 only to the extent their provisions conflict with the new section. Section 15-41-200 does not address expressly whether its protection applies to the decedent's estate. Consequently, its application to exempt property from the claims of estate
creditors is problematic. Presumably, if § 15-41-200 does not apply to decedent's estates,
then the provisions of § 15-41-100 and -310, since not in conflict and therefore not superseded to that extent, continue to apply.
244. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 62, art. 6 (1976). Although for purposes of
article 6, a nonprobate transfer transfers possession or enjoyment at the death of the
transferor, the rendering of a transfer as nontestamentary presupposes that some interest has presently transferred at the time the transfer became effective during the transferor's lifetime. The transferee of a nontestamentary transfer effected during the transferor's lifetime acquires a future interest, which enables that transferee to demand
possession or enjoyment in the future (often upon the death of the transferor), but also
to acquire certain rights contemporaneously with the transfer. The failure by a trans-
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South Carolina law addressed some of the issues of testamentary
versus nontestamentary transfers by statute, some by case law,
and some not at all. The Code divides its consideration of nonprobate transfers into two general areas-multiple-party accounts and other types of provisions dealing with transfer of
possession or enjoyment (usually payment) at the death of the
transferor.2 4 5
A.

Multiple-Party Accounts

The Code recognizes multiple-party accounts 246 as valid
nontestamentary transfers based on the theory of a third party

beneficiary contract to make a gift. 247 Certain sections ascertain
rights among the parties; other provisions protect financial institutions when they make payments in certain situations.2 4 s

Using various theories for support, prior South Carolina law
recognized as nontestamentary and valid those accounts analo-

gous under prior law to the multiple-party accounts of the new
Code.24 e

feror to presently transfer some interest in addition to the future right of possession or
enjoyment may render the transfer testamentary. A testamentary transfer not executed
in compliance with the formalities necessary to create a valid will may be invalid. Unfortunately, a review of the case law indicates substantial confusion among the various
courts as to when and whether a certain transfer presently transfers some interest to the
transferee, thereby rendering the transfer nontestamentary and effective to pass possession or enjoyment upon the transferor's death, or fails to presently transfer some interest, thereby rendering the transfer testamentary and in violation of the statutory requirements for proper will execution. Indeed, to say that some present transfer of an
interest is all that is needed to effectuate a nontestamentary transfer may be too simplistic. Some courts appear not to recognize this criterion in the determination of whether a
transfer is testamentary.
245. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-6-101, -102, -201 (1976).
246. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-101(5) (1976) defines multiple-party account as either a
joint account, a payable on death (POD) account, or a trust account.
247. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-106 comment (1976).
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-102 (1976). The SCPC provides that a creditor of a decedent may claim an interest in the account to the extent of the decedent's beneficial interest in the account before death. The Code limits the claim to the extent other assets of
the estate are insufficient to pay the creditor. The creditor must serve written demand
upon the personal representative and, if necessary, commence an action within two years
after the decedent's death. See id. § 62-6-107 (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171
comment (S.530)).
249. Prior South Carolina law used contract, gift, and trust theories to support the
nontestamentary validity of such accounts. See Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 620,
118 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1961).
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1. Rights Among Parties
The SCPC defines the term "party" to include a person who
has a present right to demand payment. 5 A payable on death
(POD) payee is a party only after all original payees have
died.251 A beneficiary of a trust account is a party when that

beneficiary acquires a present right of withdrawal. 2
(a) During Lifetime

The SCPC provides that, while all are alive, joint account
holders own in proportion to their net contributions to the account, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of intent to
the contrary.2 53 A POD account with a single original payee belongs to that original payee to the exclusion of a POD payee; a

POD account with more than one original payee belongs to those
payees according to the net contribution rule governing the
rights of joint account holders. 54 Unless otherwise indicated, a
trust account belongs to the trustee during his lifetime. If the

account has more than one trustee, the net contribution rule
used with respect to joint accounts is applicable. 55
250. S C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-101(7) (1976). For the definition of payment, see id. § 626-101(8) (1976). A guardian, conservator, personal representative, or assignee (including
a creditor) is a party, unless otherwise indicated by context. Id. § 62-6-101(7).
251. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-101(7) (1976). A POD payee is a person designated on a
POD account who may request payment from the account after the death of a named
person (who typically will be known as an original payee). A POD account is payable to a
person (original payee) during his lifetime, but upon the death of that person the account is payable to the POD payee. Note that the SCPC uses "P.O.D." to describe payable on death accounts and payees. See id. § 62-6-101(10), (11).
252. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-101(7) (1976). A beneficiary of a trust account acquires a
present right of withdrawal upon the death of all trustees, by a designation on the account contract, or by "clear and convincing evidence" of an irrevocable trust. See, e.g.,
id. § 62-6-103(c) (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 comment (S.530)).
253. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-103(a) (1976). The net contribution of a party consists of
all deposits made by or for that party, less all withdrawals made by or for him, plus a
pro-rated share of all interest accruing on that account. Id. § 62-6-101(6).
254. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-103(b) (1976).
255. Id. § 62-6-103(c). The terms of the account contract or clear and convincing
evidence of an irrevocable trust can serve to indicate a contrary intent overriding the
operation of this section. The SCPC, as originally enacted, may have failed to consider
clearly a type of trust account sometimes offered by financial institutions. In these accounts, the grantor creates the account and names a different person or entity as the
trustee. The intention of the grantor may be to retain the right to withdraw all or part of
these funds during his lifetime, with the beneficiary to acquire the right to withdraw
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Prior South Carolina law may have been in accord with respect to joint account holders generally,"' but considered married account holders as each owning one-half of the account, regardless of the contribution ratio.257
(b)

At Death

The SCPC presumes a right of survivorship for a joint account unless a party files with the financial institution a writing
which indicates a contrary intent. ' If more than one party survives the decedent party, then the share in the account of each
survivor equals the share each owned when all parties were alive
plus an equal portion of the decedent's remaining share as constituted immediately before his death. The right of survivorship
continues among the surviving parties.259
Upon the death of an original payee of a POD account, if
one or more other original payees survive, the rules with respect
to the death of a party to a joint account apply.26 0 Upon the
death of the sole or last surviving original payee, the account
belongs to the surviving POD payee. If more than one POD
upon the grantor's death (and perhaps upon the satisfaction of additional conditions
precedent, such as requiring the beneficiary to reach a certain age). The grantor would
not intend the trustee to have a right to withdraw, but would want him to serve only
nominally as the caretaker of the account. As noted above, however, § 62-6-103(c), in its
original version, gave the trustee a beneficial interest in the account "[u]nless a contrary
intent is manifested by the terms of the account or the deposit agreement or there is
other clear and convincing evidence of an irrevocabletrust. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
Arguably, by referring to "other" evidence of an "irrevocable" trust, the Code restricted
the grantor's ability to prevent the trustee from obtaining a right to withdraw to those
limited situations where the contrary intent is manifested by an account contract that
refers to the trust as irrevocable. If so, then the grantor may not have been able to
prevent the trustee from acquiring a right to withdraw in revocable trust accounts. To
clarify this issue, the General Assembly technically amended § 62-6-103(e) to include
those trust accounts in which the grantor does not serve as trustee. Id. (as amended by
1987 S.C. Acts

-,

No. 171 (S.530)).

256. See Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961); Karesh, Wills and
Trusts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 14 S.C.L.Q. 227, 228-44 (1961).
257. Clinkscales v. Clinkscales, 275 S.C. 308, 270 S.E.2d 715 (1980); Langston v.
Langston, 250 S.C. 363, 157 S.E. 2d 858 (1967).
258. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-104 (1976). The party may file this writing either at the
time of the creation of the account or thereafter. The Code considers as nontestamentary
those transfers resulting from the application of § 62-6-104. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6106 (1976).
259. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-104(a) (1976).
260. Id. § 62-6-104(b)(1).
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payee survive, each takes an equal share, but without a right of
survivorship among them.2"'
Upon the death of a trustee of a trust account, if one or
more other trustees survive, the rules regarding the death of a
party to a joint account apply.2 6 2 Upon the death of the sole or
last surviving trustee, the account belongs to the surviving beneficiary. 263 If more than one beneficiary survive, each takes an
equal share, but without a right of survivorship among them.2 64
All other accounts do not pass to the surviving party, but rather
pass as part of the decedent's estate.26 5
A party cannot change by will the trust beneficiary designation for a trust account or the POD payee designation for a POD
account. Nor can a party change by will the effect of a right of
survivorship which arises pursuant to the account agreement or
the Code, except to the extent a party owns an interest in a joint

account during his lifetime.

6

Prior South Carolina law presumed a right of survivorship
for joint accounts unless there was evidence of a different
intent. 6 7
2.

Protectionof FinancialInstitutions

Under the SCPC, a financial institution may pay without
liability to any party with certain exceptions. 2 s The Code does

261. Id. § 62-6-104(b)(2). The account or deposit agreement, however, can provide
for a right of survivorship.
262. Id. § 62-6-104(c)(1).
263. Id. § 62-6-104(c)(2). The indication of a contrary intent can overcome the right
of the beneficiary to take the account upon the death of the last surviving trustee.
264. Id. § 62-6-104(c)(2). The account or deposit agreement, however, can provide
for a right of survivorship.
265. Id. § 62-6-104(d).
266. Id. § 62-6-104(e). The proof of intent to change a right of survivorship, where
allowed, must be clear and convincing.
267. The presumption arose from the statutory sections protecting a bank from liability for payment to a joint accountholder. See Johnson v. Herrin, 272 S.C. 224, 227-28,
250 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1978).
268. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-103 (1976). Caveat: The definition of party. Payment
may be made to any of the parties to the account without inquiry as to the source of the
funds or as to the intended application of the funds. Note that under the original!y enacted version of § 62-6-108, an issue may have arisen regarding the ability to create an
account which requires more than one signature of a party to withdraw. To clarify this
issue, the General Assembly technically amended § 62-6-108 to recognize accounts requiring more than one signature. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-108 (1976) (as amended by 1987
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not protect the financial institution when it knew or should have
known that payment might be improper. Thus, the Code affords
no protection if the financial institution pays to the personal
representative of a deceased party to a joint account, unless the
financial institution receives proof that the deceased party was
the last survivor among the parties to the account or unless the
account did not provide for a right of survivorship. 8 9 Nor may
the financial institution pay the proceeds of a POD account,
without liability, to a POD payee or his personal representative
270
without proof that the POD payee survived all original payees.
The Code does not protect the financial institution for payments
made to the personal representative of a deceased original payee
without proof that the deceased original payee survived all other
original and POD payees.17 1 The financial institution also may

not pay, without liability, to the personal representative of a deceased trustee of a trust account, unless it receives proof that
the deceased trustee survived all other trustees and beneficiaries

27 2

Finally, the Code does not protect a financial institu-

tion which pays to a beneficiary, or to the personal representative of a deceased beneficiary, without proof that the beneficiary
survived all trustees.
Prior law provided for a presumption of a right of survivor-

S.C. Acts

-,
No. 171 (S. 530)). S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-105 (1976) deals only with rights
of survivorship and apparently not with lifetime rights.
269. Id. § 62-6-109 (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 (S.530)). Unless the
deposit agreement indicates otherwise, the financial institution may, without liability,
make payment to a party regardless of whether any other party is deceased or
incapacitated.
270. Id. § 62-6-110 (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -, No. 171 (S.530)). The Code
allows the financial institution to pay to a POD payee who survives all original payees
regardless of whether other POD payees survive. This is consistent with the ability of the
financial institution to pay to any party without regard to the rights of others, see supra
note 268, even though as between the parties (since no right of survivorship exists), other
POD payees, or their estates, may have rights in the account.
271. Id.
272. Id. § 62-6-111 (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -,
No. 171 (S.530)). This restriction does not apply if the beneficiary was not required to survive by the terms of the
agreement or otherwise.
273. Id. § 62-6-111 (as amended by 1987 S.C. Acts -,
No. 171 (S.530)). The Code
allows the financial institution to pay to a beneficiary who survives all trustees regardless
of whether other beneficiaries survive. This is consistent with the ability of the financial
institution to pay to any party without regard to the rights of others, see supra note 268,
even though as between the parties (since no right of survivorship exists), other beneficiaries, or their estates, may have rights in the account.
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ship for joint accounts and for the protection of financial institu-

tions that made payments to a party to a joint account. 4 The
law did not address specifically the treatment of POD accounts
and trust accounts.
B. Nontestamentary Transfers Other than Multiple-Party
Accounts
The SCPC recognizes any written instrument that otherwise
27 5
qualifies as either a contract, a gift, a conveyance, or a trust.
Prior South Carolina law varied in its recognition of different
types of will substitutes as nontestamentary or testamentary.2 7 6
V.

CONCLUSION

One of the stated purposes of the SCPC is "to simplify and
clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents. ' '21 Whether
the Code accomplishes this objective should not be answered
now, but rather in the future, after due time for the consideration of its provisions as applied to the South Carolina practice of
trusts and estates. In the interim, lawyers should recognize the
changes effected by the Code with respect both to the immediate
274. The South Carolina cases based the presumption of the right of survivorship
for joint accounts on the statutory sections protecting financial institutions for payment
to a party. See Johnson v. Herrin, 272 S.C. 224, 250 S.E.2d 334 (1978). The presumption
of the right of survivorship could be overcome by evidence of contrary intent.
275. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-201 (1976). Note that this section does not automatically
render nontestamentary all written instruments which attempt to warrant nontestamentary status. To be considered nontestamentary, the written instrument must qualify on
its own as a valid contract, gift, conveyance, or trust. Presumably, prior South Carolina
law would control the determination of such validity. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-103
(1976) which provides that, unless displaced by the provisions of the Code, the principles
of law and equity supplement the Code. See also supra note 244.
276. See, e.g., Carolina Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Rogers, 282 S.C. 184, 318 S.E.2d 357
(1984); Johnson v. Herrin, 272 S.C. 224, 250 S.E.2d 334 (1978); Gilford v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 257 S.C. 374, 186 S.E.2d 258 (1972); Judson v. Solomons, 257 S.C. 343, 185
S.E.2d 821 (1971); Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961); Watkins v.
Hodge, 232 S.C. 245, 101 S.E.2d 657 (1958); Swygert v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 229 S.C.
199, 92 S.E.2d 478 (1956); Babb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 S.C. 1, 77 S.E.2d 267
(1953); Hydrick v. Hydrick, 142 S.C. 531, 551-55, 141 S.E. 156 (1927); Jaggers v. Estes, 21
S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 181 (1847); M'Ginney v. Wallace, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 127 (1837);
Singleton v. Administrix of Bremar, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 5 (1826); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-11-280 (1976); Karesh, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 18 S.C.L. REV. 165, 209-10 (1966).
277. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-102(b)(1) (1976).
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practice and to the contemplation of additional refinement to
the law as may be necessary. Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the SCPC is to provide an impetus to recognize the
need for constant review and for the implementation of the
changes needed to render more effective the law of trusts and
estates, meeting more effectively the requirements and the expectations of the citizens governed by it.
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